<i>B‐Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism</i><sup>1</sup>

Diekemper, Joseph

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00654.x

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Eternalists of course have rebutted (see e.g., Oaklander 1998), but the issue keeps coming up. For example, Diekemper (2007) has recently insisted that that there can be no open future, without the pastist or presentist rejection of future events. That this matter is particularly thorny is testified by the recent work by Cameron (2009, 2011), who criticize Diekemper (Barnes and Cameron 2009, p. 305), on the basis of their conception of the open future as indeterminacy.…”

Section: The Motivations For Presentismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Moderate presentism

Orilia

2015

Philos Stud

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Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as ''ex-concrete.'' It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties.

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Section: The Motivations For Presentismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Moderate presentism

Orilia

2015

Philos Stud

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“…A way of avoiding the recourse to agents is to appeal to the truth values of future contingent propositions, such as the famous proposition that there will be a sea battle tomorrow (see, e.g., Diekemper, 2007, sect. I, part B).…”

Section: Manuscritomentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Existential side of the Eternalism-Presentism Dispute

Orilia

2016

Manuscrito

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The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes --emotional or ethical --that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue.

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“…Many philosophers argue that certain features are incompatible with an open future by arguing that such features entail that we are powerless over certain future events: Tooley (1997: 43–8) considers an argument that threatens our power over whether nuclear war takes place. Diekemper (2007) considers an argument that threatens our power over whether a Third World War takes place. Markosian (1995), in a less calamitous vein, considers an argument that threatens Joe Montana’s power over his future lunch.…”

Section: What Is the Open Future Intuition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But again it is unclear why this conclusion is supposed to follow from the fact that the alternative futures contain counterpart utterances and utters of the actual ones. Joseph Diekemper (2007) objects to a diverging worlds account on similar grounds claiming, ‘the possibility of an alternate history containing an alternate future is not a possibility for me ’ (443).…”

Section: Of‐compatibilism and Genuine Possibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Open Future

Torre

2011

Philosophy Compass

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A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future?

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B‐Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism¹

Cited by 18 publications

References 20 publications

Moderate presentism

Moderate presentism

On the Existential side of the Eternalism-Presentism Dispute

The Open Future

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B‐Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism1

Cited by 18 publications

References 20 publications

Moderate presentism

Moderate presentism

On the Existential side of the Eternalism-Presentism Dispute

The Open Future

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

B‐Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism¹