Moderate presentism

Abstract

Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as ''ex-concrete.'' It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties.

Temporal ersatzism

“…According to ersatzism about past objects , past objects still exist, but are not concrete. Versions of this view have been put forward by Williamson (, ), Sullivan (), and Orilia ().…”

“…In the last decade or so, versions of temporal ersatzism have been put forward by, among others, Bourne (), Crisp (), Meyer (), Williamson (, ) Sullivan (), Wüthrich (), and Orilia () . The goal of this paper is to give the reader a sense of the scope of available temporal ersatzist views, the ways in which the analogy with modal ersatzism may be helpful in characterizing and defending those views, and the sorts of considerations that are relevant when evaluating particular versions of temporal ersatzism.…”

“…See Orilia () for a version of temporal ersatzism that endorses Williamson's account of past objects but denies the existence of past events.…”

The Moral Desirability of Presentism

“…I have argued elsewhere (Orilia 2016) in favor of a certain version of presentism, moderate presentism, which restricts the claim that whatever exists is present to events and allows for past and future times (understood in a substantialist sense) and for past objects (understood, following Williamson 2002, as "ex-concrete"). My argument will turn around the existence or non-existence of past events and has nothing to do with whether or not there are past (ex-concrete) objects and past times.…”

Presentism and Modal Realism

“…This view is given its fullest defense by Francesco Orilia in(Orilia, 2016), where it is called moderate presentism. Williamson himself does not develop a theory of presentism from his view of the non-concrete.…”