Technological Discontinuities and Competitive Advantage: A Historical Perspective on Formula 1 Motor Racing 1950–2006

Abstract

This paper considers the interplay between technological discontinuities and competitive performance. Much of the work on technological discontinuities has focused on macro levels of analysis such as industries and technologies rather than specific firms. This study uses a historical perspective on Formula 1 motor racing to explore the dynamics between firm level performance and technological discontinuities over a 57 year period. The study supports the findings of previous research that incumbent firms are often unable to adapt to the impact of exogenous shocks. However the study also reveals situations where a relatively small number of firms are able to sustain their competitive superiority through a number of successive discontinuities. I suggest that, in addition to dynamic capabilities, these firms possess sustaining capabilities - munificent resource configurations which extend the time available for firms to adapt to technological changes - thereby allowing them to remain competitive across discontinuities. Copyright (c) 2010 The Author. Journal compilation (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies.

Expert leaders in a fast-moving environment

“…The budgets of constructor teams are largely secret. Most of the money is spent on technology which contributes a great deal to a team's winning prospects (Read 1997, Wright 2001, Jenkins 2010. The R&D investment in F1 eventually shows up as new technologies in automobiles that the public drive.…”

“…This relationship is embodied in F1; regulation is unambiguously associated with innovation and performance (Jenkins, 2004;Jenkins, Pasternak, & West, 2007;Khanna, Kartik, Varma, & Lane. 2003;Jenkins 2010;Aversa, 2013;Marino, Aversa, Mesquita & Anand, 2013), and regulatory compliance produces a level playing field for all competing teams. Indeed, rule changes are sometimes made with the intention of curtailing the dominance of one team, for example, with Ferrari and Michael Schumacher in 2003 (Hoisl 2011).…”

Formula for success: Multilevel modelling of Formula One Driver and Constructor performance, 1950–2014

“…However that literature is crossdisciplinary, involving, for example, computational simulations of race results (Loiacono et al 2010, Bekker andLotz 2009), economic approaches that consider the importance of, and adaptability of, F1 teams as firms (Jenkins 2010, Jenkins andFloyd 2001), knowledge transfer between teams (Jenkins & Tallman, 2015) analyses of car design over time from an engineering perspective (Dominy andDominy 1984, Dominy 1992), analyses of specific tracks (Alnaser et al 2006) and their impacts on tourism (Henderson et al 2010), and historical approaches to the sport (Hassan 2012). There have been a few statistical analyses of race results, although these are often limited to a few races or seasons (Bekker andLotz 2009, Muehlbauer 2010).…”

Technological discontinuities, outsiders and social capital: a case study from Formula 1

“…Furthermore the sporting nature of the sector means that, as earlier researchers (Henry and Pinch, 2000;Jenkins and Floyd, 2001;Jenkins, 2010) have noted, large quantities of high quality data are available.…”