Talking Peace, Making Weapons

Abstract

A growing literature suggests that nuclear assistance from other countries is an important determinant of whether states pursue nuclear weapons. Existing work does not consider, however, the most widely available source of assistance-the Technical Cooperation (TC) program administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA assistance is an important piece of the nonproliferation regime's central bargain: member states enjoy nuclear assistance in exchange for agreeing not to seek nuclear weapons. Using a data set of TC projects since 1972, we examine whether international nuclear assistance is associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. We hypothesize that some TC assistance reduces the cost of pursuing nuclear weapons, making weapons programs more likely. We find that receiving TC related to the nuclear fuel cycle is a statistically and substantively significant factor in state decisions since 1972 to seek nuclear weapons, with important implications for existing theories of nuclear proliferation.

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

“…To put the above positioning in more perspective, the extant literature on the subject has primarily articulated three strands: determinants of access to weapons; drivers of the weapons industry; and nexuses between arms trade and other institutional and macroeconomic factors. In the first strand, studies have focused on, inter alia: the selection of weapons and ornaments (McCullough, Miller, and Emlen 2016); defensive weapons and defense signals in plants (Maag et al 2015); the relevance of technical corporations in making nuclear weapons (Brown and Kaplow 2014); access to firearms by people with mental disorders (Pinals et al 2015); and reducing access to weapons by persons with suicidal intensions (Barber and Miller 2014).…”

“…Variables in the conditioning information set include: security officers and police; political instability; military expenditure; death from internal conflicts; and United Nations Peace Keeping Forces (UNPKF). These indicators have been documented to determine access to weapons and weapons proliferation (Barber and Miller 2014;Brown and Kaplow 2014;Maag et al 2015;McCullough, Miller, and Emlen 2016).…”

Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea

“…Third, our experimental findings point to a possible link between the civilian nuclear industry and nonproliferation. Technological explanations for nuclear proliferation discovered the effect of sensitive nuclear assistance on the likelihood of nuclear proliferation (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig, 2009). Building upon these findings, the findings of our paper identified specific conditions under which the civilian nuclear industry could reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.…”

Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

“…To code whether a country has a peaceful nuclear energy programme, I look at whether a country produced electricity using nuclear sources (using the data from Brown and Kaplow, 2014). 6 Countries producing electricity from nuclear sources can be considered as being generally more interested in nuclear politics.…”

“…Countries that benefitted from peaceful nuclear assistance have been more successful in converting their nuclear know-how into military programmes (Fuhrmann, 2009(Fuhrmann, , 2012. This observation does not apply only to bilateral aid -countries receiving multilateral nuclear assistance from the IAEA are also more likely to embark on the nuclear proliferation path (Brown and Kaplow, 2014). 2 Having a peaceful nuclear programme gives states the possession of materials and of knowledge which could potentially give a country the ability to produce nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke, 2007).…”