Taking Religion Seriously? Habermas on Religious Translation and Cooperative Learning in Post-secular Society

Abstract

This article evaluates Jürgen Habermas's attempt to reopen political liberalism to religion. In trying to “take religion seriously,” Habermas goes further than John Rawls and other liberal theorists by affirming that religious traditions articulate truths on which democratic societies continue to depend for their civic and moral health. “Post-secular” societies, in his view, should learn from religion by translating its “moral intuitions” into universal secular language. Although Habermas in this way appears friendlier to religion than Rawls, unlike Rawls he also calls for the “modernization of religious consciousness.” This theological transformation not only reveals the foundationalist presuppositions of liberalism, but also points to a highly attenuated conception of learning from religion. Taking religion seriously will require us to be open to its insights not only when they agree with, but especially when they challenge, our secular presuppositions. This dimension of religion is at risk of getting “lost in translation” in the Habermasian paradigm.

Development of Religious Consciousness in the Value of Respect to Parents

“…Habermas initiated the importance of religious awareness modernization [12]. The religious institutions have an important role and function significantly in building up personal and social religion adherents [13].…”

The Reciprocal Translation Proviso: An Alternative Approach to Public Reason

“…The final background critique concerns whether Habermas’ process is something other than translation (Cooke 2006; Chambers 2007; Harrington 2007; Ungureanu 2008; Gordon 2013; Pensky 2013; Walhof 2013; Wolterstorff 2013; Areshidze 2017). Some critics claim that finding “different epistemic means” is nothing more than the discovery of an overlapping consensus (Cooke 2007, 228–29; Ungureanu 2008, 408; Lafont 2009, 134, 2013, 237; Chambers 2010; Areshidze 2017, 2, 8). For example, Sikka claims that Habermas process is not “translation,” but a practice of “isolating the intuitions and judgments” in religion that can persist independently of their theological justifications (2016, 99).…”

“…The crucial critique, and our point of departure from Habermas, is that the burdens are still too asymmetrically distributed (Lafont 2007; 2013; Yates 2007; Boettcher 2009; Bernstein 2013; Walhof 2013; Wolterstorff 2013; Areshidze 2017, 5). The ITP fails to achieve its objectives and Habermas remains too close to Rawls, who he rejects for placing undue burdens on religious citizens.…”

“…Concerns about the unidirectional character of Habermas’ proposal are related to the asymmetry objections. As Giorgi Areshidze writes, shared “civic space” would ideally be created through a learning process with “terms that are less unidirectional than the ones that Habermas and Rawls propose” (2017, 12). Similarly, Cook points out that unidirectional input and removal of religion may impoverish the transformative nature of deliberation, which Habermas claims to champion (2007, 228).…”

African, Religious, and Tolerant? How Religious Diversity Shapes Attitudes Toward Sexual Minorities in Africa

“…Our study identifies the potentially important role that religious diversity plays in explaining variation in what otherwise appears to be unyielding opposition to sexual minorities. Following Areshidze's (2017) call for social scientists to take religion seriously by considering dynamics that counter mainstream secular presuppositions, we join an emerging literature that challenges many assumptions about the relationship between religion and beliefs regarding homosexuality (Ayoub 2014; 2016).…”