Sweden: the referendum as an instrument for defusing political issues

Ruin, Olof

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24796-7_11

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…National referendums have been held twice in Finland, five times in Sweden, and six times in Norway. In all three countries the right to initiate referendums lies with parliament and the government (Suksi, 1996;Ruin, 1996;Wyller, 1996). No mechanism for any form of popular initiatives exists.…”

Section: The Institutional Framework the Decision To Hold A Referendummentioning

confidence: 97%

Referendum Democracy

2001

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Section: The Institutional Framework the Decision To Hold A Referendummentioning

confidence: 97%

Referendum Democracy

2001

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“…In the second case, it has been noted that some political parties are internally divided on integration issues in EU referendums (Bogdanor 1981; Ruin 1996; Ray 1999; Widfeldt 2004). To represent intra‐divided parties in the referendum‐generated political space, we extend party locations along the integration dimension while holding constant their positions on the domestic dimension (see Figure 2).…”

Section: A Referendum‐generated Political Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A good example is the Swedish referendum on EU membership in 1994. In this vote, the Swedish Social Democratic Party organised two separate campaign committees, on the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ sides, to appease internal dissidents (Ruin 1996: 180). In 2005, the French Socialist Party also opted for rival campaigns on the Constitutional Treaty to accommodate the disagreement between party leaders.…”

Section: Party Competition In Eu Referendumsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coping with a two‐dimensional political space: Party mobilisation in referendums on European integration

Shu

2009

European J Political Res

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European Union referendums invite national electorates to vote on transnational cooperation and regional integration, thereby creating tension between transnational ballot issues and domestic electoral mobilisation. Because of the tension, domestic political parties are forced to confront a two‐dimensional political space in EU referendums. In the referendum‐generated political space, unless integration issues are more salient than domestic concerns, intra‐divided and inter‐converged mainstream parties tend strategically to abstain from the campaigns. Yet, explicit inter‐party collusion may allow the pro‐integration mainstream to form a party cartel in EU referendums. Suggestive evidence is drawn from a case study of the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. Based on a party‐candidate survey, Irish parties are mapped onto a latent two‐dimensional political space. The findings shed new light on the initial abstention of Irish mainstream parties in the first Nice campaign and their subsequent mobilisation in the second referendum.

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“…Governmental parties may also wish to have a sufficient time gap between the referendum and the election in order to avoid discussions over the issue during the electoral campaign. The removal of an issue from the electoral agenda was a motivation, for example, for the Swedish referendum on the European Union membership in 1994 (Ruin 1996). Since governmental parties sometimes hold referendums in order to avoid taking a position on a difficult issue, the argument that referendums can be used to avoid electoral accountability is supported.…”

Section: Accountability and Responsibility In Government‐initiated Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 4 In Sweden, the results of two referendums were eventually disregarded. The decision to drive on the right side of the road was made in 1967 despite the result of the referendum held in 1955, and the timetable of dismantling nuclear power plants has not followed the result of the referendum held in 1980 (Ruin 1996). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the problems of responsibility and accountability in referendums

Setälä

2006

European J Political Res

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Abstract. Supporters of representative democracy tend to be critical of referendums. They argue that referendums give citizens more responsibility for political decisions than they have either the capacity or the competence to take. Moreover, they argue that referendums may undermine representatives' accountability. In this article, these arguments about responsibility and accountability are analyzed in the light of normative theories of democracy, especially the theory of deliberative democracy. Furthermore, different institutional forms of referendum are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the following aspects: the extent to which governments control the use of referendums, how referendums interact with parliamentary decision making, and whether referendums are advisory or binding. It is argued that sometimes governments indeed use their control over referendums to avoid taking stands on difficult issues. More importantly, however, current forms of government‐initiated referendums tend to weaken the accountability of the representatives, at least when interpreted in terms of liberal and deliberative democracy, and to distort parliamentary deliberations. Since delegation is a necessity in modern democracies, referendums should not undermine the mechanisms of representative democracy. In addition to the issues of citizens' capacity and competence, this viewpoint should be taken into account when designing referendum institutions.

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Sweden: the referendum as an instrument for defusing political issues

Cited by 14 publications

References 1 publication

Referendum Democracy

Referendum Democracy

Coping with a two‐dimensional political space: Party mobilisation in referendums on European integration

On the problems of responsibility and accountability in referendums

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