Sufficiency and the Threshold Question

Abstract

In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a view is plausible. Lastly, I distinguish this view from related proposals in the literature.

The Case for Permanent Residency for Frontline Workers

“…This argument begins with a broad premise concerning inequality: inequality is often unjust, though precisely when is up for debate. Luck Egalitarians claim inequality is unjust when some are worse off due to brute luck (Dworkin 2002;Segall 2013) inequality is unjust whenever some cannot live sufficiently decent lives (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015;Huseby 2020). Prioritarians claim that inequality is unjust when resources are distributed merely to maximize aggregate benefits, because benefits ought to count for more the worse off an agent is (Parfit 2012;Peterson and Hansson 2005).…”

Sufficientarianism1

“…14 Casal notes that with only one threshold sufficientarians will either place it too high for the negative thesis to be plausible, or too low for the positive thesis to be plausible. 15 With a high and a low threshold, multiple threshold sufficientarians can have one that it is supposedly extremely important to meet, motivated by the positive thesis, and another at which indifference begins, motivated by the negative thesis.…”

Sufficiency and the Minimally Good Life

“… 7 This way of thinking about contentment develops the Frankfurtian view extended by Huseby, 2020. I hope that it provides a tool that helps policymakers and others think about where to draw a sufficiency threshold.…”

“…Sufficiency theorists claim that we must provide everyone with enough – but, to date, few well-worked out accounts of the sufficiency threshold exist, so it is difficult to evaluate this proposition. Previous theories do little more than gesture towards independent accounts of resources, capabilities, or welfare that might play the requisite role (Nussbaum, 2000; Nickel, 2007; Haybron, 2008; Brock, 2009; Hassoun, 2009; Segall, 2014; Huseby, 2020). Moreover, I believe existing accounts do not provide nearly enough guidance for policymakers (Huseby, 2010; Nielsen, 2016; Herlitz, 2018).…”

“…Others prefer to resolve tensions between helping different people by appealing to the importance of the things that help people secure a basic minimum (for some proposals, see: Raz, 1986, 308–08; Waldron, 1993). Some introduce multiple thresholds – suggesting we give priority to helping people live lives worth living before helping people reach the threshold for living a minimally good life (or vice versa) (Casal, 2007; Huseby, 2020). Some agree that everyone should be able to secure the basic minimum but also maintain that we owe people more than this (Casal, 2007; Arneson, 2000).…”