Sufficiency and the Minimally Good Life

Abstract

What, if anything, do we owe others as a basic minimum? Sufficiency theorists claim that we must provide everyone with enough – but, to date, few well-worked-out accounts of the sufficiency threshold exist, so it is difficult to evaluate this proposition. Previous theories do not provide plausible, independent accounts of resources, capabilities, or welfare that might play the requisite role. Moreover, I believe existing accounts do not provide nearly enough guidance for policymakers. So, this article sketches a mechanism for arriving at an account of the minimally good life that can help locate the sufficiency threshold.

Rethinking solidarity towards equity in global health: African views

“…Solidarity points more in the direction of seeing the other as another self whose well-being is conjoined to our own. We empathize with others putting ourselves into their shoes in deciding what they need to flourish, in part, because their flourishing is part of our own [ 26 , 27 ].…”

“…Resolving disagreements about what people need to live minimally well may require deliberation and discussion with others who are similarly reasonable, caring and free. Whatever form the minimally good life takes, this account of solidarity sets the following standard: When a person’s ability to live a minimally good life is not secure, then she is entitled to the aid of others [ 26 , 27 ] in helping her secure a minimally good life, provided that this help will not jeopardize their own ability to live a minimally good life [ 26 , 27 ]. The notion of solidarity that we are putting forward here leads us to think that the human condition is such that solidarity is a necessary ingredient for a moral community.…”

What Do ‘Humans’ Need? Sufficiency and Pluralism

“…One option is to try to ground the theory in a higher but still universal threshold of a particular standard of life, such as a ‘good human life’ (Ram-Tiktin, 2016 ); ‘central areas of human life’ (Axelsen & Nielsen, 2015 ); a ‘minimally decent’ life (Miller, 2007 , p. 181; Shue, 1993 , p. 42); or a ‘minimally good life’ (Hassoun, 2021a , 2021b ). Common to these ideas is the thought that we can accommodate diversity in the values that people hold; we do not presume a one-size-fits-all view of what a valuable life involves, but focus instead on the common requirements for pursuing a range of values, especially through appeals to autonomy or freedom.…”

“… 2. Hassoun ( 2021a , 2021b ) uses the idea of contentment as a negative test for minimally good lives; if you would not be content with another person’s life, you should not regard it as minimally good. I assume this is a heuristic rather than a substantive threshold, and so I concentrate on Frankfurt and Huseby.…”

Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism

“…I will, then, assume that there is a non-instrumentally significant sufficientarian threshold. Sufficientarians have provided various specifications of such a threshold for instance, in terms of contentment (Huseby 2010;Hassoun 2021), absence of hypothetical compassion (Crisp 2003a), dignity (Nussbaum 2011), and freedom from duress (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015). My purpose is to explore sufficientarianism under the assumption that some such threshold is plausible, rather than to defend or criticize any particular version of the assumption.…”