Subsidies and Countervailing Duties

All these worlds are yours, except india: The effectiveness of cash subsidies to export in nepal

“…There is very limited research on the SDT principle, and most of the empirical work in this area focuses on the role of non-reciprocal preferences granted by developed countries (Ornelas, 2016); instead we examine whether the use of otherwise prohibited export subsidies can help poorer countries to export more. Similarly, we see our paper as complementary to the theoretical work investigating the normative properties of the WTO's subsidy rules (Bagwell and Staiger, 2006;Lee, 2016).…”

“…While export subsidies are ubiquitous across the world, according to the World Trade Organization, there are fewer empirical studies investigating them than almost any other instrument of commercial policy (WTO, 2006). As a case in point, the chapter by Bown and Crowley (2016) in the Handbook of Commercial Policy edited by Bagwell and Staiger entitled "The Empirical Landscape of Trade Policy" does not consider export subsidies at all (see footnote e, page 7) and the chapter on "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" by Lee (2016) in the same handbook only reviews theoretical research on this topic.…”

The Economic Structure of International Trade-in-Services Agreements

“…19 These observations suggest that as a practical matter, the taxation of services is broadly feasible when applied to service providers on a nondiscriminatory basis, but sales taxes that discriminate against foreign service providers are probably best thought of as unavailable to the importing government (perhaps for reasons of high transaction costs). 20 Formally, we introduce terms-of-trade motives, these motives would continue to push for a higher tax or lower subsidy than e¢ cient levels, and an e¢ cient agreement would then lower the tax or raise the subsidy to the e¢ cient Pigouvian level (see also note 21). 19 It is not uncommon to observe discriminatory quotas applied to foreign service providers, and one might invoke the logic of "tari¤-quota equivalence" to argue that such quotas serve as the analog of discriminatory sales taxes.…”

The Economic Structure of International Trade-in-Services Agreements

“…19 These observations suggest that as a practical matter, the taxation of services is broadly feasible when applied to service providers on a nondiscriminatory basis, but sales taxes that discriminate against foreign service providers are probably best thought of as unavailable to the importing government (perhaps for reasons of high transaction costs). 20 Formally, we introduce terms-of-trade motives, these motives would continue to push for a higher tax or lower subsidy than e¢ cient levels, and an e¢ cient agreement would then lower the tax or raise the subsidy to the e¢ cient Pigouvian level (see also note 21). 19 It is not uncommon to observe discriminatory quotas applied to foreign service providers, and one might invoke the logic of "tari¤-quota equivalence" to argue that such quotas serve as the analog of discriminatory sales taxes.…”