The Economic Structure of International Trade-in-Services Agreements

Staiger, Robert W.

doi:10.1086/712786

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Contrary to tariffs, these nontariff policy dimensions embrace no government revenue-collection motive while still affecting the terms of trade and the spatial distribution of economic activity. Thus, our article adds to the growing literature on the economics of deep integration, moving beyond the notion of tariff-oriented trade agreements (see Grossman et al, 2021;Staiger and Sykes, 2021).…”

Section: Specific Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Economic Disintegration

Janeba,

Schulz

2023

Int Economic Review

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We study the impact of unilateral economic disintegration, such as Brexit, on national and international policies. We introduce firm mobility and business‐tax policies into a general‐equilibrium trade model and analyze the effects of disintegration on tax policies of asymmetric countries. Whereas the disintegrating country taxes less, business taxes converge in the remaining economic area. We highlight important differences with existing two‐country models. Moreover, we predict a realignment of trade policies with a deeper integration inside the union and lower tariffs worldwide. The leaving country's endogenous integration response with other countries may fully compensate for the disintegration‐induced welfare losses.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

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Section: Specific Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Economic Disintegration

Janeba,

Schulz

2023

Int Economic Review

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“…This article complements previous research on regulatory protection that either focuses on partial equilibrium effects (Baldwin, 2000; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Staiger and Sykes, 2011, 2020) or uses neoclassical trade models that include only the terms‐of‐trade effect (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001; Ederington, 2001; Maggi and Ossa, 2023). My model incorporates the forces found in earlier papers, but identifies a novel and important channel through which standards affect welfare: the adjustment in the number of varieties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Regulatory Protection and the Role of International Cooperation

Mei

2023

Int Economic Review

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I develop a general‐equilibrium framework to analyze the welfare consequences of product regulations and their international harmonization. In my model, raising product standards reduces a negative consumption externality, but also increases the marginal and fixed costs of production. When product standards are set non‐cooperatively, the effects of standards on other countries' wages and number of firms are not internalized, giving rise to an international inefficiency. The World Trade Organization's non‐discrimination principle of national treatment only partly addresses this inefficiency. Welfare losses from abandoning national treatment average 2.8 percent, whereas the maximum welfare gains from efficient cooperation average 11.8 percent.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

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“…What, then, explains the striking di¤erence between GATT and GATS that I noted at the outset of this section? I now illustrate the key elements of the "missing tari¤ instrument" interpretation of this di¤erence put forward by Staiger and Sykes (2021).…”

Section: The Purpose Of Gats In a Pre-digital Worldmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…This issue arises, for example, when considering a good that is delivered from a foreign source via digital instructions for additive manufacturing ("3-D printing") in a domestic location. This issue is consequential because of the di¤erent structure and level of market access commitments in GATT (which applies to traded goods) and GATS (which applies to traded services), a di¤erence that re ‡ects in part the di¤erent policy instruments available to governments for in ‡uencing trade ‡ows across the goods and services sectors (see Staiger, 2018, andSykes, 2021).…”

Section: What Is Digital Trade?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Digital Trade Change the Purpose of a Trade Agreement?

Staiger¹

2021

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The design of a trade agreement should reflect its purpose. Does digital trade change the purpose of a trade agreement? To explore this question, I first describe the definitional and classification issues associated with digital trade, and for modeling purposes I adopt a simple taxonomy of the ways in which digital trade can arise and the policies that can be used to restrict such trade. I then review what the theoretical literature on the economics of trade agreements has to say about the purpose of a trade agreement in a pre-digital model world economy, and how this purpose can be seen to be reflected in the broad design features of both GATT and GATS, the WTO agreements that govern international trade in goods and services respectively. Finally, I introduce digital trade into the model world economy and revisit the purpose of a trade agreement. From this perspective I consider whether the rise of digital trade warrants changes in the design of the WTO.

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The Economic Structure of International Trade-in-Services Agreements

Cited by 11 publications

References 26 publications

A Theory of Economic Disintegration

A Theory of Economic Disintegration

Regulatory Protection and the Role of International Cooperation

Does Digital Trade Change the Purpose of a Trade Agreement?

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