Study on the optimal supervision strategy of government low-carbon subsidy and the corresponding efficiency and stability in the small-world network context

Fan, Ruguo; Dong, Lili; Yang, Weiguo; Sun, Jiaqin

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.044

Cited by 80 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Extensive researches have investigated China's coal mine safety inspection system by using an evolutionary game [11,12,13]. Specific to green production supervision problems, the impact of various carbon taxes and subsidies on the enterprise's lowcarbon production methods was analyzed by using the evolutionary game model [14,15]. Jiang et al considered the multiagent environmental regulation problem under Chinese fiscal decentralization [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Ma¹,

Wan²,

Jin³

2021

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Ma¹,

Wan²,

Jin³

2021

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…e replicator dynamics is proposed by Taylor and Jonker [31], the basic idea of which is that if one strategy gains more than the average income of other strategies during the game process, then it indicates that the strategy is suitable for the evolution of the group [32]. Some researchers have applied evolutionary game theory to study low-carbon scenarios [33,34], pollution regulation [35,36], enterprises' cooperation and competition in the supply chain [37][38][39], and so on. For example, He et al [32] study an effective green incentive mechanism for the government to promote green tourism development by establishing a three-party dynamic evolutionary game model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Food safety accidents occur frequently, which has caused great harm to people’s health. With the consideration that food quality requires the joint efforts of all members of the food supply chain and that quality-improving efforts for food have a positive external effect, we focus on the quality-improving effort level, which is very important for food quality and safety. This paper builds an evolutionary game model and employs the replicated dynamic equation to study evolutionarily stable strategies of suppliers and producers. Furthermore, simulation experiments are conducted to verify the modeling analyses and demonstrate the influences of game parameters. The research results show that the behavioral strategies are closely related to the factors such as the ratios of the input to the output, the cost of quality-improving efforts, the hitchhiking benefits, and the initial strategy. Only when the punishing dynamics of the government exceeds a certain value, both participants can choose the quality-improving effort strategy. Based on the results, this paper has provided some inspiration for policy-making of government institutions.

show abstract

“…Evolutionary game theory is widely used in the impact of emission reduction policies on the low-carbon behavior of enterprises. For example, Fan et al [ 30 ] constructed evolutionary game models based on agents of the government and enterprises in the cases of a lack of supervision and supervision. The optimal strategy for supervising low-carbon subsidies is studied.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Yan

Huang

et al. 2021

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

show abstract

Study on the optimal supervision strategy of government low-carbon subsidy and the corresponding efficiency and stability in the small-world network context

Cited by 80 publications

References 44 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels

Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About