Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels

Yang, Songlan; Zhuang, Jincai; Wang, Aifeng; Zhang, Yancai

doi:10.1155/2019/6242745

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(41 reference statements)

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“…The present study provides a promising method for analyzing the behavioral strategy interaction between restaurants and OFD platforms to fill this gap. [21] and [34] are similar to our study; all these studies employ evolutionary game theory to analyze OFD-related problems, while the two studies focus on food quality and food waste recycling, respectively. In addition, evolutionary game theory is employed in modeling various problems, e.g., retailer competition [35], resource management [36], and bid evaluations [37], [38].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 86%

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Online Food Delivery Platforms and Restaurants’ Interactions in the Context of the Ban on Using Single-Use Plastics

Chen

Liu

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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The boom in online food delivery(OFD) platforms brings convenience to both consumers and restaurants but leads to pollution from nonbiodegradable plastic food containers. To reduce pollution, the Chinese government enacted a ban on using multiple single-use plastics, including nondegradable OFD food containers. There may be various interests involved in enforcing the ban, so careful analysis is required before implementing the ban. This study applied evolutionary game theory to examine the interaction mechanism of the problematic behaviors between OFD platforms and restaurants. By theoretical research and simulation, we analyzed the conditions under which the game can converge to the expected outcome. In addition, we discussed the measures that are most important to promote restaurants using degradable food packaging in their service.INDEX TERMS Online food delivery, evolutionary game theory, behavior modeling, food packaging, ban on using single-use plastics.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…A solution to the change in restaurants' behavior is to punish restaurants if they insist on using SFP. Nevertheless, a series of studies have shown that it is not sensible for the government to directly supervise and punish restaurants [19]- [21]. Thus, cogovernance is introduced in implementing the ban.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Online Food Delivery Platforms and Restaurants’ Interactions in the Context of the Ban on Using Single-Use Plastics

Chen

Liu

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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“…Evolutionary game analysis based on the behavior of participants has become one of the main tools of the analysis of food safety, this is because it can involve government, consumers, companies, and other subjects. Current studies from the perspective of the evolutionary game between the two participants mainly consist of games between the government and companies [ 28 ], and between food suppliers and manufacturers [ 29 ]; the studies from the perspective of tripartite participants mainly consist of games of governments, companies, as well as consumers [ 30 ].…”

Section: Methods and Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

Xue

Geng

Kiprop

et al. 2021

Foods

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The food safety strategies of companies are a key point in the reduction of food safety risks. In order to encourage the evolution of food safety strategies of companies from food fraud to safety investment, this study builds an evolutionary game model, taking large and small companies as participants, to reveal the dynamic process of spillover effects influencing the choice of food safety strategies of companies. The study shows that (1) the food safety strategies of companies change from safety investment to food fraud, along with the increasing opportunity costs of safety investment. (2) The costs structure of small companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of safety investment, while the costs structure of large companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of food fraud. (3) Both competition effects and contagion effects encourage companies to choose safety investment. The more obvious spillover effects of incidents on food safety are, the more likely it is that companies will choose safety investments. (4) Increasing the costs to companies for incidents on food safety and reducing the opportunity cost of safety investment motivates companies to choose safety investment. Consequently, a new orientation of regulations for food safety is formed: the government should allocate different regulatory resources to counteract food fraud behaviors or technologies with a different benefit, should increase the technical costs and costs incurred from committing acts of food fraud, and should expand spillover effects of incidents on food safety.

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“…Further, Yang et al designed an evolutionary game model to study evolutionarily stable strategies of food suppliers and producers. eir results showed that the behavioral strategies are the hitchhiking benefits, the cost of quality-improving efforts, and the initial strategy [30]. According to Neuwirth et al, the response efficacy of consumers is positively correlated with communicating intentions and self-efficacy, but it demonstrates a negative relationship to perceived barriers [31].…”

Section: Food Safety Standards and Monitoring Evaluation In Localmentioning

confidence: 99%

Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

et al. 2021

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Food safety risk communication has attracted widespread attention in China. The government is the leader in food risk communication. It has even more impact on consumers’ willingness to communicate food risk. Thus, this paper constructs a risk communication game model composed of the central government, local government, and consumers under food safety regulatory agencies in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. In the end, some numerical examples have been displayed to simulate the agents’ choices. The results show that penalty cost, governance intensity, communication cost, and reputation of the government have an essential impact on consumers’ enthusiasm for food safety risk communication decision-making behavior. Furthermore, the choice of food safety risk communication strategies is performed with a dynamic process, which is constantly adjusted and optimized. The evolutionary game system can converge on an ideal state under certain conditions. Moreover, this study proposes suggestions and measures conducive to the tripartite game, which can offer valuable guidance on food risk communication practice and improve government efficiency in China. This research can provide the evolutionary mechanism and broaden our understanding of the relationship between food safety risk governance and food risk communication strategies.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Food Quality considering Effort Levels

Cited by 12 publications

References 38 publications

Online Food Delivery Platforms and Restaurants’ Interactions in the Context of the Ban on Using Single-Use Plastics

Online Food Delivery Platforms and Restaurants’ Interactions in the Context of the Ban on Using Single-Use Plastics

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

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