Strategic Hedging and China’s Economic Policy in the Middle East

Abstract

This study presents the strategic hedging framework as a way to trace the determinants of the foreign policies of hedging states. We use the case of Chinese energy security strategy in the Middle East as an illustrative case study. It first uses four criteria to establish that China’s energy security strategy in the Middle East is a strong example of strategic hedging behaviour. Then it examines the impact of oil production in the Middle East countries on the growth of Chinese economic relationships with these countries. The results of this study show clearly that oil production plays an important role in the Sino-Middle East relations. We find a positive relationship between oil production in Middle East countries, on the one hand, and the distribution and growth of China’s trade and investment with these countries, on the other hand. These results confirm that strategic hedging behaviour leads to developing China’s economic relations with the oil-producing countries in order to cover its growing needs for energy to support its economic growth. This article represents the first attempt to trace the impact of strategic hedging behaviour on the foreign policies of hedging states. Thus, it contributes to the support of the strategic hedging framework as a new theory in international relations.

The internal and external roles of Iraqi popular mobilization forces

“…As previous studies demonstrate, strategic hedging is a mixed strategy of cooperation and conflict, relying on both soft and hard power tools. In practice, this means a small state deliberately cooperates with its rival to escape threats while at the same time embracing elements of hard balancing against it Salman, and Geeraerts, 2015;Sherwood, 2006).…”

“…In addition, hedging is less costly and includes low risk compared to the confrontation strategy, and creates a kind of "a geopolitical insurance strategy". In fact, anarchic, uncertain environments like the Gulf are particularly ideal for hedging strategies 27 . Other measures that could be taken or significantly expanded in order to counter the Iran-affiliated PMF threats include using intelligence and influence to build relations with Ahwazi Arabs in Southern Iran in order to send a clear message to Iran on the importance of non-interference.…”

Hedging in the Middle East and China‐U.S. Competition1

“…China, in turn, has followed a second‐tier state policy of “strategic hedging”—employing a wider range of both military and nonmilitary strategies in order to improve its relations with Middle Eastern countries and thereby hedge against risks arising from more confrontational policies in the future (Salman & Geeraerts, ). A Sino‐U.S.…”

“…Despite the conceptual confusion in some empirical cases, strategic hedging is clearly distinct from soft balancing in significant respects: (i) While soft balancing is equally attractive for second‐tier states in both concentrating and deconcentrating unipolar systems, strategic hedging is more attractive under deconcentrating unipolar conditions that involve more possibility of sharing the spoils with the system; (ii) The hedging state is willing to suffer additional temporary costs in the present to better prepare for the future; (iii) Most importantly, strategic hedging addresses a wider range of both military and nonmilitary strategies, and has much stronger connection to system structure than soft balancing (Tessman & Wolfe, , p. 220); and (iv) Second‐tier states usually resort to soft balancing as a result of conflicting foreign policy interests with the system leader, while strategic hedging has a coherent long‐term plan aimed at developing economic and military capabilities while avoiding direct confrontation with this leader (Tessman, ). The concept of strategic hedging draws on the works of, that is, Medeiros (/), Foot (), Goldstein (), Goh (/2008), Tessman and Wolfe (), Tessman (), Salman and Geeraerts () and provides a theoretical model for analyzing the foreign policy behavior of “second‐tier” states toward a systemically dominant actor in the international system. In a situation of uncertainty about future developments, intentions, or foreign policy reactions of this dominant actor, second‐tier states opt to strategically hedge against potential risks arising from their foreign policies.…”

“…China, in turn, has followed a second-tier state policy of "strategic hedging"-employing a wider range of both military and nonmilitary strategies in order to improve its relations with Middle Eastern countries and thereby hedge against risks arising from more confrontational policies in the future (Salman & Geeraerts, 2015). A Sino-U.S. military conflict is unlikely to take place in the near future due to the magnitude of U.S. military power as well as significant differences in their military capabilities.…”