Strategic delegation in a legislative bargaining model with pork and public goods

Christiansen, Nels

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.10.001

Cited by 27 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…55 See also Volden & Wiseman (2008) correcting an error. 56 Other papers that consider provision of public goods in legislative bargaining include Baron (1996), Besley & Coate (1998), LeBlanc et al (2000, Battaglini & Coate (2007, Battaglini et al (2012), Christiansen (2013), Bowen et al (2014Bowen et al ( , 2017. Most of these papers study environments with endogenous status quo and we defer our discussion of them to our companion survey paper Eraslan et al (2019).…”

Section: Bargaining Over Public Goodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan

Evdokimov

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

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Section: Bargaining Over Public Goodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan

Evdokimov

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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“…see, e.g., Besley and Coate (2003), Redoano and Scharf (2004), Dur and Roelfsema (2005), Harstad (2010) and Christiansen (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Habla

Winkler

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents caring less for environmental damages than they do themselves in case of an international market regime, while they opt for self-representation in case of domestic markets. This strategic delegation incentive renders the linking of permit markets less attractive and constitutes a novel explanation for the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international permit markets.

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“…In our theory, we explicitly consider the interaction between different legislative districts, and how this alters voters' preferences over politicians. While the mechanism we uncover is novel, the existence of a tension between candidates' preferences and their ability to implement certain policies is documented elsewhere (Besley and Coate, 1997;Harstad, 2010;Volden and Wiseman, 2007;Christiansen, 2013;Huber and Ting, 2013). 7 Within this literature, the closest paper to ours is Huber and Ting (2013).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 82%

The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation

Mattozzi¹,

Snowberg²

2018

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and UCB for useful conversations, comments, and encouragement. We also thank the Casa del Popolo di Fiesole for their hospitality, although it may have been reduced had they known what we were writing. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Strategic delegation in a legislative bargaining model with pork and public goods

Cited by 27 publications

References 15 publications

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation

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