2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.09.006
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Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Abstract: We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents caring less for environmental damages than they do themselves in case of an international market regime, while they opt for self-representation in case of domestic markets. This strategic delegation incentive rende… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…This means that mapping emissions to damages via a linear specication is a good approximation. It is also consistent with the current literature (Habla and Winkler, 2018;Holtsmark and Weitzman, 2020).…”
Section: Introducing Functional Forms For the Benet And Damage Functionssupporting
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This means that mapping emissions to damages via a linear specication is a good approximation. It is also consistent with the current literature (Habla and Winkler, 2018;Holtsmark and Weitzman, 2020).…”
Section: Introducing Functional Forms For the Benet And Damage Functionssupporting
confidence: 93%
“…Using the denition employed by Habla and Winkler (2018), we propose the following structural forms for the benet and damage functions. We dene the benet function as…”
Section: Introducing Functional Forms For the Benet And Damage Functionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a model consistent with several interpretations of strategic delegation, Habla and Winkler (2018) analyze the formation of international emission permit markets. They nd that principals have an incentive to delegate strategically and choose agents that exhibit less green preferences than they do themselves.…”
Section: Hierarchical Interplay Between Domestic Political Pressure and International Climate Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both papers find that there is no ex ante reason to expect emissions to decline following linkage. Habla and Winkler (2018) also allow for delegation of the domestic permit supply to an agent, leading to wider domestic emission caps, meaning higher emissions, when countries are linked. Lapan and Sikdar (2019) conclude that international trade in emission permits creates incentives for the individual countries to widen their national caps on emissions when pollution is only partially transboundary.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%