Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan, Hülya; Evdokimov, Kirill S.

doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633

Cited by 41 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 216 publications

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“…Strategic bargaining theory, boosted by the contribution of Rubinstein (1982), has contributed significantly to our understanding of negotiation processes. For surveys of the extensive literature on strategic bargaining, we refer the reader to the surveys by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Muthoo (1999), Houba and Bolt (2002), Ray (2007) and Eraslan and Evdokimov (2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Costless delay in negotiations

Herings

Houba

2021

Econ Theory

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We study bargaining models in discrete time with a finite number of players, stochastic selection of the proposing player, endogenously determined sets and orders of responders, and a finite set of feasible alternatives. The standard optimality conditions and system of recursive equations may not be sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) in case of costless delay. We present a characterization of SSPE that is valid for both costly and costless delay. We address the relationship between an SSPE under costless delay and the limit of SSPEs under vanishing costly delay. An SSPE always exists when delay is costly, but not necessarily so under costless delay, even when mixed strategies are allowed for. This is surprising as a quasi SSPE, a solution to the optimality conditions and the system of recursive equations, always exists. The problem is caused by the potential singularity of the system of recursive equations, which is intimately related to the possibility of perpetual disagreement in the bargaining process.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Costless delay in negotiations

Herings

Houba

2021

Econ Theory

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“…In its original form, the authors framed their model as an abstraction for problems of "distributive or expenditure policy in a unicameral, majority rule legislature not favoring any member of the legislature or any particular outcome". Since then, a plethora of applications and theoretical extensions have been set forth in and beyond political science (Eraslan and Evdokimov, 2019) and their model has been the subject of a vast number of experimental investigations which are the focus of this paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments

Barański

Morton

2020

SSRN Journal

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We collected and analyzed the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (1989 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.) experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of experimental parameters such as group size and discount factor we are able to test whether or not the theoretical point predictions and comparative statics hold and find virtually no support for the theory. Novel findings are reported about the effect of group size and discounting on distribution of the surplus, the proposer's share, agreement * We would like to thank

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“…As in Eraslan and Evdokimov (2019), by "legislative bargaining" we mean multilateral bargaining situations in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent and agreement on a proposal binds all parties. They survey the literature on legislative bargaining with exogenous status-quo in which players decide on a policy through voting between an exogenously given status-quo and a proposal offered by a proposer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining

2020

Self Cite

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This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discus bargaining over redistributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.

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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Cited by 41 publications

References 216 publications

Costless delay in negotiations

Costless delay in negotiations

The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining

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