State Capacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Bersch, Katherine; Praça, Sérgio; Taylor, Matthew M.

doi:10.1111/gove.12196

Cited by 128 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Meritocratic recruitment in particular became a key policy recommendation for developing economies seeking to increase bureaucratic autonomy, lower, corruption, and minimize partisan influence (Dahlstr€ om, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012;Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen, 2016;Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). Second, research examined the quality of the bureaucracy beyond such procedural measures, focusing on fiscal capacity, the professionalization of bureaucrats, levels of corruption, and bureaucratic impartiality (Bersch, Praça, & Taylor, 2017;Geddes, 1994).…”

Section: S Tate Cap Ac I Ty and Cli Ma Te P Ol I Cymentioning

confidence: 99%

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

Meckling

Nahm

2018

Governance

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State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policy making, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policy making is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity.

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Section: S Tate Cap Ac I Ty and Cli Ma Te P Ol I Cymentioning

confidence: 99%

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

Meckling

Nahm

2018

Governance

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“…More recently, Meyer‐Sahling et al () provide evidence based on individual‐level data from a survey of public servants in five Eastern European countries; and Oliveros and Schuster () conduct a conjoint experiment in the Dominican Republic, finding the, to our knowledge, first (survey) experimental support for the argument that merit recruitment limits corruption. Finally, Bersch et al () use administrative data from Brazilian agencies to show a positive correlation between agency politicization and corruption. This finding is supported by Heywood and Meyer‐Sahling's () qualitative analysis of the Polish ministerial bureaucracy.…”

Section: What We Know and What We Don'tmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beyond creating a bulwark against political pressure, employment protection contributes to a central Weberian bureaucracy characteristic that may further contain corruption: job stability. Job stability paves the way for longterm socialization processes, which may help establish an esprit de corps that can curb corruption (Rauch and Evans 2000;Dahlström et al 2012;Bersch et al 2017). In addition, the expectation of a stable public service career, as opposed to a short or uncertain appointment, may make employees less prone to take the risk of short-term corrupt gains (Heywood and Meyer-Sahling 2013;Herron et al 2016;Bersch et al 2017).…”

Section: Job Stability and Tenure Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

Meyer‐Sahling

Mikkelsen

Schuster

2018

Public Administration

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Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies—36 in total—that do address civil service management and anti‐corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areas—such as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practices—is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.

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“…While some sectors of the Brazilian bureaucracy may be described as 'islands of excellence' and closely resemble the Weberian ideal of public administration (Bersch et al 2017), local politicians remain dependent of unstable, and o en unlawful, connections with social elites. is system of 'partial embedded autonomy ' Evans (2012) provides the required stability for the political system to operate, yet it o ers signi cant opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour.…”

Section: Political Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beasts of Prey or Rational Animals? Private Governance in Brazil's Jogo do Bicho

Freire¹

2017

Preprint

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is article presents a rational choice account of Brazil's jogo do bicho ("animal game"), possibly the largest illegal lo ery game in the world. In over 120 years, the jogo do bicho has grown from a local ra e to a multimillion-dollar business, and the game has played a major role in Brazil's cultural and political life. My analysis of the jogo do bicho has three goals. First, Iexamine the mechanisms that fostered the lo ery's notable growth outside the boundaries of Brazilian law. Second, I investigate how the animal game nanciers combine costly signals and selective incentives to induce cooperation from members of the community. Lastly, I discuss the relationship between the lo ery sponsors and Brazilian representatives, particularly how the bicheiros exploit the fragmentation of Brazil's political system to advance their long-term interests.

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State Capacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Cited by 128 publications

References 46 publications

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

Beasts of Prey or Rational Animals? Private Governance in Brazil's Jogo do Bicho

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