The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

Abstract

State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policy making, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policy making is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity.

Political Economy Determinants of Carbon Pricing

“…Government interference in prices risks preventing such prices being passed to consumers by regulated electricity companies, which would cause the price signal to disappear (Teng et al 2014;Lo 2016). According to Meckling and Nahm (2018), this independence from political pressure is the second important causal pathway from good governance to carbon pricing. They argue that independence of state bureaucracy from political pressures has facilitated ambitious carbon pricing in California.…”

The politics of climate change: Domestic and international responses to a global challenge

“…Maor et al (2017b) consider disproportionate policy responses to climate change to be deliberate decisions taken by governments and propose a list of factors that are likely to result in such measures. The first factor introduced by the authors refers to the domestic economy and its expected wins and losses resulting from climate change (see also, e.g., Meckling and Nahm, 2018). If economic actors conceptualize climate change as an opportunity for business, they may not only support proportionate policy responses but also demand policy overreactions.…”

“…The processing in the narrow sense occurs within institutions . In this context, a state’s capacity should be critical for the climate policy outputs it produces (Meckling and Nahm, 2018). The design of government ministries and agencies, for example, should make a difference in terms of how scientific evidence on climate change is taken into account in the policy process and whether climate change is included in the political agenda (Tosun, 2018).…”

“…While organized business interests are already powerful in shaping climate policy responses, Wilkinson’s (2020) analysis of Australia shows that this holds even truer when they form networks with climate skeptics and politicians. But networks consisting of business interests only can also prevent proportionate responses to climate change (Meckling and Nahm, 2018). On the other hand, transnational city networks have the potential to strengthen climate policy by scaling up local-level policy experiments to the national level although they have yet to live up to this potential (Domorenok et al, 2020).…”

Transitional assistance policies for just, equitable and smooth low-carbon transitions: who, what and how?

“…To understand the suitability of alternative transitional assistance policies and strategies, it is therefore necessary to draw on political science theories to illuminate various phenomena, including the power, objectives, strategies and tactics of vested interests and the way they organise to influence politics and the policy process (Downie 2017(Downie , 2019Kern and Rogge 2018;Meadowcroft 2009Meadowcroft , 2011 as well as the strategies and tactics of relevant political parties, and party competition/cooperation dynamics (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013). It is also necessary to incorporate theories of the state into such analysis and, more specifically, theories of state capacities and institutions, dominant state discourses and paradigms, and the historical, spatial and material forces affecting states (Hall 1993;Hughes and Urpelainen 2015;Johnstone and Newell 2018;Kern 2011;Meckling and Nahm 2018). In this respect we echo Johnstone and Newell's call to understand the state in a "dynamic, relational and practice-oriented manner" (2018, 80) when analysing TAP possibilities and prospects.…”