Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason<sup>1</sup>

Marshall, Colin

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00533.x

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Previous interpreters have noticed some of these concerns and have offered partial solutions, though none have pinpointed what I think is the underlying structural problem facing Spinoza's account. For but one recent example, Colin Marshall (2012) addresses what I call the representational problem by arguing that, according to Spinoza, an individual converts passions into actions by first representing them as passions and then her shifting attention to more general truths about that passion. (Marshall also provides a critical summary of previous attempts to answer Bennett's particular objections.)…”

Section: Actions and Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He suggests that a particular change that is a passion for an individual can also be an action for the same individual . Admittedly, Spinoza sometimes uses a subjunctive mood to make this point (IIId3), in which case maybe he means only that what is actually a passion for an individual could have been an action instead (Marshall 2012: 148–49). This would be less odd, even if counterfactuals are generally tricky to evaluate for Spinoza.…”

Section: Actions and Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spinozistic Selves

Newlands¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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Spinoza's Ethics promises a path for sweeping personal transformations, but his accounts face two sets of overarching problems. The first concerns his peculiar metaphysics of action and agents; the second his apparent neglect of the very category of persons. Although these are somewhat distinct concerns, they have a common, unified solution in Spinoza's system that is philosophically rich and interesting, both in its own right and in relation to contemporary work in moral philosophy. After presenting the core of the problem facing Spinoza's action theory, I turn to his overlooked account of selves, one that can be illuminated by contemporary work on so-called deep-self theories. I then show how Spinoza's distinctive account of selves prevents his action theory from collapsing into metaphysical incoherence, and conclude with an implication for Spinoza's broader account of transformation.

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Section: Actions and Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Actions and Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spinozistic Selves

Newlands¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…Dolayısıyla Sandler ve Soyarslan arasındaki çatışmaya da bir çözüm önermektedir. (Marshall, 2012). Burada ortaya konulmaya çalışılacak sorunları göz ardı ederek Spinoza tarafından ortaya konulan terapi yöntemlerinin, özellikle de duygulara dair upuygun idealar edinme yönteminin geçerliliğini gerekçelendirmeye çalışan güncel çalışmalardan bazıları için bkz.…”

Section: Duygular Ile Ideaların Içerdiği Inanç Arasındaki Ilişkiyi Göunclassified

A Critical Assesment of Spinoza’s Theory of Affect: Affects, Beliefs, and Human Freedom

Aktas¹

2018

Beytulhikme an International Journal of Philosophy

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Affects are intentional structures of beliefs and desires. Many philosophers have plausibly argued that Spinoza's theory of ideas is a kind of theory of belief by this time yet this claim has rarely been taken into account when it comes to Spinoza's theory of affects, which is actually a part of his theory of ideas. This paper shows that if this point is taken seriously when regarding Spinoza's theory of affects we reach significant results about the fifth part of Ethics. To show this, I shall strive to show that all affects depend on some sort of beliefs by analyzing Spinoza's theory of affects in terms of his theory of ideas, and in particular an affirmation which an idea naturally involves. From this revelation, we will be able to see that Spinoza's theory of affects appeared in third and fourth part of Ethics is inconsistent with the fifth part of Ethics in so far as three therapy methods given in the beginning of the fifth part of Ethics are considered. Additionally, and suitably to this assertion, I will also show that arguments by which soundness of these therapy methods are guaranteed seem actually logically invalid. Finally, I will try to revise Spinoza's therapy methods by taking all errors and core ideas in Spinoza's theory of affects into consideration.

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“…Given Spinoza's claim that human beings are constantly acted upon by external causes, Bennett doubts that it would be possible to become properly “active.” Lee Rice, Martin Lin, and Colin Marshall have offered various strategies to deal with Bennett's challenge and make sense of how human beings could reach a sufficient degree of activity to mitigate the passions. See, for instance, Rice ; Lin ; and Marshall . LeBuffe (, 215–22) elaborates on the connection between being active and the mind's capacity of forming adequate ideas.…”

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confidence: 99%

Spinoza's Rethinking of Activity: From the Short Treatise to the Ethics

Sangiacomo¹,

Nachtomy²

2018

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he will later introduce in the Ethics (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics. We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy

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Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason¹

Cited by 16 publications

References 16 publications

Spinozistic Selves

Spinozistic Selves

A Critical Assesment of Spinoza’s Theory of Affect: Affects, Beliefs, and Human Freedom

Spinoza's Rethinking of Activity: From the Short Treatise to the Ethics

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Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason1

Cited by 16 publications

References 16 publications

Spinozistic Selves

Spinozistic Selves

A Critical Assesment of Spinoza’s Theory of Affect: Affects, Beliefs, and Human Freedom

Spinoza's Rethinking of Activity: From the Short Treatise to the Ethics

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Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason¹