Somewhat more than path dependence: The Spanish employers’ peak organisation and social dialogue in light of the crisis of the industrial relations system

Abstract

The literature has shown that, much the same as other employers in southern Europe, the Spanish employers’ peak association, the Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organisations (CEOE), did not take advantage of the radical legislative deregulation of 2010–2012 and, to the contrary, helped perpetuate the traditional institutions that order the industrial relations system. This article contributes to a better understanding of the underlying reasons that guided the CEOE’s behaviour, and also incorporates the Spanish case into the literature on the adaptation of employers’ organisations – and how the institutions and path dependence have an influence – in the face of the widespread trends of economic deregulation. Finally, this article provides up-to-date, solid and reliable data on membership of employers’ associations in Spain, the lack of which is one of the shortcomings of the literature.

Employer associations in light of the Great Recession and radical labour market deregulation in Southern Europe: An analysis from the perspective of company membership

“…In fact, the growth of the services sector has even been considered as a factor of membership decline (Gooberman et al 2019b, 13-14). Studies on Spain and Italy show the predominance of the industrial sector in EAs (Fanfani et al 2023;Sánchez-Mosquera 2022) and this could be compatible with the decline in membership hypothesised. In this respect, the interaction of this independent variable with other variables should be taken into account, as the industrial sector has a long tradition of sectoral bargaining and a strong union presence (Demougin et al 2019, 10).…”

“…As a matter of fact, according to some studies, this third function of private services (elective goods) to companies helps explain the strong membership resilience of these associations, making up for their reduced capacity for coordinating multi-employer bargaining (Brandl and Lehr 2019;Gooberman and Hauptmeier 2022). On the contrary, related to the aforementioned deregulation processes, some national studies have noted falling EA membership in certain countries (Fanfani et al 2023;Gooberman et al 2019b;Sánchez-Mosquera 2022;Silvia and Schroeder 2007).…”

“…One of the explanations for this behaviour is the inability of micro and small companies, prevalent in the Southern European business fabric, to bear the costs arising from company-level collective bargaining, and also the organisational legitimisation that multi-employer bargaining offers EAs (Bulfone and Afonso 2020). On the contrary, the literature on EA membership, as indicated above, and the cases of Spain and Italy, have highlighted the organisational influence and power of large employers and sectors with a high level of EA membership, and with a long tradition of sectoral (multi-employer) bargaining and union representation in their companies (Fanfani et al 2023;Sánchez-Mosquera 2022).…”

Empirical challenges in the study of employer associations and their representativeness

“…A similar concern is actually at the heart of the debates regarding historical series of trade union membership in France. Before the 1990s, there was no evidence available from state-managed surveys to measure trade union membership, and the Labour department publishes estimates (see Pignoni, 2016) that rely on extrapolation made from the number of monthly union dues paid by workers to the main French unions (see Bévort, 1995;Labbé, 1995). The challenge with these extrapolations came from the fact that it was well-known that many workers were not paying their union dues every month, so that dividing by 12 the total number of monthly dues declared by the main French trade unions largely underestimates the total number of workers that paid dues at least once during a given year.…”

“…To understand how this conflict of interest between affiliated firms and the EA representing them was resolved, the literature highlights a number of factors: the industrial relation system EAs operate in, their governance structure, the type of firms they represent, path dependence, and so forth. Sánchez‐Mosquera (2022) highlight the role of path dependence and country‐specific institutions to understand the opposition of the main Spanish EA to market liberalization. Studying Italy, Portugal and Spain, Bulfone and Afonso (2020) highlight the heterogeneity across EAs, and show that those representing small firms (numerous in these countries) were particularly prone to resist to state‐led reforms liberalizing industrial relations during the Euro crisis because these firms need industry‐level bargaining.…”