Some Thoughts about the Roles, Responsibilities and Future Scope of Auditors‐General

Abstract

This article treats Auditors‐General in a generic sense, but focuses on those institutions developed out of the Westminster system of government which undertake financial statement or regularity audits as well as performance or value for money or efficiency‐type audits. The audit offices included are those at both federal and state levels in Australia, the United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada and New Zealand. The article is in two parts. The first selectively addresses perceived roles and responsibilities arising out of parliamentary legislation, debates and reviews or inquiries, Auditor‐General reports, papers or similar contributions by academic and other interested commentators. The second deals with the future scope for influence, focusing mainly on possible contributions to the improved performance of the public sector including that of audit offices themselves. The latter recognises that auditors‐general are very much part of the governance framework within which they operate. While they might be able to influence its development, the framework largely dictates their role, responsibilities and possible scope for action. Reflecting on that framework beyond the next few years might be an inviting conceptual exercise but is unlikely to add much value.

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