Smokefree implementation in Colombia: Monitoring, outside funding, and business support

Uang, Randy; Crosbie, Eric; Glantz, Stanton A.

doi:10.21149/7884

Cited by 13 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…This experience is consistent with the results of similar support for civil society groups in other countries, including South Africa,5 Mexico,59 Costa Rica,63 Colombia,64 Uruguay65 and Thailand 3. In many African countries like South Africa, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Nigeria and Kenya, civil society groups partner with government to achieve progress in tobacco policy formulation and implementation 61.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries

2018

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The Policy Dystopia Model and WHO categories of industry interference provide a helpful framework for understanding tobacco control debates in low/middle-income countries (LMICs) as in high-income countries. One difference in LMIC is the important role of international tobacco control advocates in supporting national tobacco control advocates. This partnership is important in pushing for FCTC-compliant legislation and countering industry activities in LMIC.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries

2018

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“…In Colombia, the prevalence of tobacco consumption in the last month has decreased from 21.4% in 1993 to 12.85% in 2007 (Macias et al, 2014). This country ratified in 2008 the World Health Organization (WHO) framework convention on tobacco control (Ministerio de la Protección Social, 2008), and in 2009 adopted a national smoke-free law (República de Colombia, 2009), before many low and medium-income countries (Uang et al, 2017; World Health Organization., 2013). However, the more recent data from 2015 showed a prevalence of 13% (7.4% in women and 18.8% in men) (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho - Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of smoking and physical inactivity on self-rated health in women in Colombia

Romero

Urbina

Cristancho-Montenegro

et al. 2019

Preventive Medicine Reports

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The aim of this study was to assess the association between poor and fair self-rested health, smoking, and leisure-time physical inactivity in Colombian women. A cross-sectional study using the data from the 2010 Colombian National Demographics and Health (ENDS) and Nutritional Situation (ENSIN) Surveys was conducted. Multivariate logistic analysis for self-perceived health status in 12,431 women aged 13–49 years old and 8224 women aged 18–64 years old were performed. Independent variables included smoking, leisure-time physical inactivity, anthropometric and socio-demographic information. Current smoking and leisure-time physical inactivity were associated with poor and fair self-rated health status (OR 1.78, CI 1.41, 2.25; OR 1.30, CI 1.03, 1.62; respectively). Other significantly associated variables were age (OR 1.68, CI 1.46, 1.92 for 30–49 years; OR 2.32, CI 1.96, 2.74 for 50–64 years), socio-economic strata (OR 7.24, CI 3.81, 13.76 for strata 1–3), educational level (OR 1.70 to 2.77 compared to technical or university), obesity (OR 0.81, CI 0.70, 0.93 for normal body mass index), geographical region (OR 0.67, CI 0.53, 0.85 for Bogotá, compared to Amazon and Orinoco regions), and no affiliation to health system (OR 1.22, CI 1.03, 1.44). Smoking and leisure-time physical inactivity were significantly associated with poor and fair self-rated health in Colombian women. Promoting leisure-time physical activity and implementing smoking cessation strategies specifically in female population, mainly from low to medium strata are suggested to improve their self-perceived health status and control chronic noncommunicable diseases.

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“…MoUs represent another instalment in a history of ineffective voluntary agreements the TTCs promote to avoid government regulation 23 31–48. TTCs used MoUs to establish a framework of government cooperation and as a public relations vehicle to identify themselves as both the victim of and solution to illicit tobacco trade 16.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…TTCs have long-promoted voluntary self-regulation agreements with governments, including voluntary marketing codes and health warnings,23 31–33 ‘accommodation’ programmes instead of smoke-free laws,34–36 ‘youth smoking prevention programmes’31 37–41 and corporate social responsibility campaigns42–48 to avoid effective regulation. None of these voluntary measures reduced tobacco consumption 31 38 43 49…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

2019

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ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments’ law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs’ claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

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Smokefree implementation in Colombia: Monitoring, outside funding, and business support

Cited by 13 publications

References 23 publications

Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries

Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries

Impact of smoking and physical inactivity on self-rated health in women in Colombia

Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

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