Objective To analyse the evolution and diffusion of health warnings on cigarette packs around the world, including tobacco industry attempts to block this diffusion. Methods We analysed tobacco industry documents and public sources to construct a database on the global evolution and diffusion of health warning labels from 1966 to 2012, and also analysed industry strategies. Results Health warning labels, especially labels with graphic elements, threaten the tobacco industry because they are a low-cost, effective measure to reduce smoking. Multinational tobacco companies did not object to voluntary innocuous warnings with ambiguous health messages, in part because they saw them as offering protection from lawsuits and local packaging regulations. The companies worked systematically at the international level to block or weaken warnings once stronger more specific warnings began to appear in the 1970s. Since 1985 in Iceland, the tobacco industry has been aware of the effectiveness of graphic health warning labels (GWHL). The industry launched an all-out attack in the early 1990s to prevent GHWLs, and was successful in delaying GHWLs internationally for nearly 10 years. Conclusions Beginning in 2005, as a result of the World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), GHWLs began to spread. Effective implementation of FCTC labelling provisions has stimulated diffusion of strong health warning labels despite industry opposition.

ObjectiveDescribe the process of enacting and defending strong tobacco packaging and labelling regulations in Uruguay amid Philip Morris International’s (PMI) legal threats and challenges.MethodsTriangulated government legislation, news sources and interviews with policy-makers and health advocates in Uruguay.ResultsIn 2008 and 2009, the Uruguayan government enacted at the time the world’s largest pictorial health warning labels (80% of front and back of package) and prohibited different packaging or presentations for cigarettes sold under a given brand. PMI threatened to sue Uruguay in international courts if these policies were implemented. The Vazquez administration maintained the regulations, but a week prior to President Vazquez’s successor, President Mujica, took office on 1 March 2010 PMI announced its intention to file an investment arbitration dispute against Uruguay in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Initially, the Mujica administration announced it would weaken the regulations to avoid litigation. In response, local public health groups in Uruguay enlisted former President Vazquez and international health groups and served as brokers to develop a collaboration with the Mujica administration to defend the regulations. This united front between the Uruguayan government and the transnational tobacco control network paid off when Uruguay defeated PMI’s investment dispute in July 2016.ConclusionTo replicate Uruguay’s success, other countries need to recognise that strong political support, an actively engaged local civil society and financial and technical support are important factors in overcoming tobacco industry’s legal threats to defend strong public health regulations.

Objective: To identify and monitor food industry use of political practices during the adoption of nutrition warning labels (WL) in Colombia. Design: Document analysis of publicly available information triangulated with interviews. Setting: Colombia. Participants: Eighteen key informants from the government (n 2), academia (n 1), civil society (n 12), the media (n 2) and a former food industry employee (n 1). Results: In Colombia, the food industry used experts and groups funded by large transnationals to promote its preferred front-of-pack nutrition labelling (FOPL) and discredit the proposed warning models. The industry criticised the proposed WL, discussing the negative impacts they would have on trade, the excessive costs required to implement them and the fact that consumers were responsible for making the right choices about what to eat. Food industry actors also interacted with the government and former members of large trade associations now in decision-making positions in the public sector. The Codex Alimentarius was also a platform through which the industry got access to decision-making and could influence the FOPL policy. Conclusions: In Colombia, the food industry used a broad range of political strategies that could have negatively influenced the FOPL policy process. Despite this influence, the mandatory use of WL was announced in February 2020. There is an urgent need to condemn such political practices as they still could prevent the implementation of other internationally recommended measures to improve population health in the country and abroad, nutrition WL being only of them.

Background In late 2018 the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed a new trade agreement (most commonly referred to by its US-centric acronym, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA) to replace the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new agreement is the first major trade treaty negotiated under the shadow of the Trump Administration’s unilateral imposition of tariffs to pressure other countries to accept provisions more favourable to protectionist US economic interests. Although not yet ratified, the agreement is widely seen as indicative of how the US will engage in future international trade negotiations. Methods Drawing from methods used in earlier health impact assessments of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, we undertook a detailed analysis of USMCA chapters that have direct or indirect implications for health. We began with an initial reading of the entire agreement, followed by multiple line-by-line readings of key chapters. Secondary sources and inter-rater (comparative) analyses by the four authors were used to ensure rigour in our assessments. Results The USMCA expands intellectual property rights and regulatory constraints that will lead to increased drug costs, particularly in Canada and Mexico. It opens up markets in both Canada and Mexico for US food exports without reducing the subsidies the US provides to its own producers, and introduces a number of new regulatory reforms that weaken public health oversight of food safety. It reduces regulatory policy space through new provisions on ‘technical barriers to trade’ and requirements for greater regulatory coherence and harmonization across the three countries. It puts some limitations on contentious investor-state dispute provisions between the US and Mexico, provisions often used to challenge or chill health and environmental measures, and eliminates them completely in disputes between the US and Canada; but it allows for new ‘legacy claims’ for 3 years after the agreement enters into force. Its labour and environmental chapters contain a few improvements but overall do little to ensure either workers’ rights or environmental protection. Conclusion Rather than enhancing public health protection the USMCA places new, extended, and enforceable obligations on public regulators that increase the power (voice) of corporate (investor) interests during the development of new regulations. It is not a health-enhancing template for future trade agreements that governments should emulate.

This study examines how health advocates and the Australian government responded to international commercial pressure during the implementation of tobacco standardised packaging (SP) as a measure to reduce non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Relevant government and NGO documents, and media items were reviewed. Policymakers and health advocates (n = 19) in Australia were interviewed. In 2009, Australia’s National Health Taskforce recommended SP, which the Australian government announced in April 2010. In response, tobacco companies threatened the government with litigation in both domestic and international courts, claiming that SP would violate their investment and intellectual property rights. However, these legal threats were unsuccessful in forcing the government to withdrawal the SP proposal. Tobacco companies legally challenged SP, but as of February 2018 failed with each legal challenge. The political success of enacting and implementing SP against international commercial pressure was supported by legal preparation and support, and a whole-of-government approach. The Australian SP case illustrates how, against international commercial opposition, governments can build and maintain political and official support to enact and implement progressive public health measures to reduce NCDs.

Objectives To analyse the tobacco industry’s use of international trade agreements to oppose policies to strengthen health warning labels (HWLs). Design A review of tobacco industry documents, tobacco control legislation and international treaties. Results During the early 1990s, the tobacco industry became increasingly alarmed about the advancement of HWLs on cigarettes packages. In response, it requested legal opinions from British American Tobacco’s law firms in Australia and England, Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry and the World Intellectual Property Organisation on the legality of restricting and prohibiting the use of their trademarks, as embodied in cigarette packages. The consistent legal advice, privately submitted to the companies, was that international treaties do not shield trademark owners from government limitations (including prohibition) on the use of their trademarks. Despite receiving this legal advice, the companies publicly argued that requiring large HWLs compromised their trademark rights under international treaties. The companies successfully used these arguments as part of their successful effort to deter Canadian and Australian governments from enacting laws requiring the plan packaging of cigarettes, which helped delay large graphic HWLs, including ‘plain’ packaging, for over a decade. Conclusions Governments should not be intimidated by tobacco company threats and unsubstantiated claims, and carefully craft HWL laws to withstand the inevitable tobacco industry lawsuits with the knowledge that the companies’ own lawyers as well as authoritative bodies have told the companies that the rights they claim do not exist.

Objective To describe the approval process and implementation of the 100% smokefree law in Mexico City and a competing federal law between 2007 and 2010. Methods Reviewed smokefree legislation, published newspaper articles and interviewed key informants. Results Strong efforts by tobacco control advocacy groups and key policymakers in Mexico City in 2008 prompted the approval of a 100% smokefree law following the WHO FCTC. As elsewhere, the tobacco industry utilised the hospitality sector to block smokefree legislation, challenged the City law before the Supreme Court and promoted the passage of a federal law that required designated smoking areas. These tactics disrupted implementation of the City law by causing confusion over which law applied in Mexico City. Despite interference, the City law increased public support for 100% smokefree policies and decreased the social acceptability of smoking. In September 2009, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the City law, giving it the authority to go beyond the federal law to protect the fundamental right of health for all citizens. Conclusions Early education and enforcement efforts by tobacco control advocates promoted the City law in 2008 but advocates should still anticipate continuing opposition from the tobacco industry, which will require continued pressure on the government. Advocates should utilise the Supreme Court’s ruling to promote 100% smokefree policies outside Mexico City. Strong advocacy for the City law could be used as a model of success throughout Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Objective To analyse the process of implementing and enforcing smoke-free environments, tobacco advertising, tobacco taxes and health warning labels from Costa Rica's 2012 tobacco control law. Method Review of tobacco control legislation, newspaper articles and interviewing key informants. Results Despite overcoming decades of tobacco industry dominance to win enactment of a strong tobacco control law in March 2012 consistent with WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the tobacco industry and their allies lobbied executive branch authorities for exemptions in smoke-free environments to create public confusion, and continued to report in the media that increasing cigarette taxes led to a rise in illicit trade. In response, tobacco control advocates, with technical support from international health groups, helped strengthen tobacco advertising regulations by prohibiting advertising at the point-of-sale (POS) and banning corporate social responsibility campaigns. The Health Ministry used increased tobacco taxes earmarked for tobacco control to help effectively promote and enforce the law, resulting in high compliance for smoke-free environments, advertising restrictions and health warning label (HWL) regulations. Despite this success, government trade concerns allowed, as of December 2015, POS tobacco advertising, and delayed the release of HWL regulations for 15 months. Conclusions The implementation phase continues to be a site of intensive tobacco industry political activity in low and middle-income countries. International support and earmarked tobacco taxes provide important technical and financial assistance to implement tobacco control policies, but more legal expertise is needed to overcome government trade concerns and avoid unnecessary delays in implementation.