Should Digital Contact Tracing Technologies be used to Control COVID-19? Perspectives from an Australian Public Deliberation

Abstract

Mobile phone-based applications (apps) can promote faster targeted actions to control COVID-19. However, digital contact tracing systems raise concerns about data security, system effectiveness, and their potential to normalise privacy-invasive surveillance technologies. In the absence of mandates, public uptake depends on the acceptability and perceived legitimacy of using technologies that log interactions between individuals to build public health capacity. We report on six online deliberative workshops convened in New South Wales to consider the appropriateness of using the COVIDSafe app to enhance Australian contact tracing systems. All groups took the position (by majority) that the protections enacted in the app design and supporting legislation were appropriate. This support is contingent on several system attributes including: the voluntariness of the COVIDSafe app; that the system relies on proximity rather than location tracking; and, that data access is restricted to local public health practitioners undertaking contact tracing. Despite sustained scepticism in media coverage, there was an underlying willingness to trust Australian governing institutions such that in principle acceptance of the new contact tracing technology was easy to obtain. However, tensions between the need to prove system effectiveness through operational transparency and requirements for privacy protections could be limiting public uptake. Our study shows that informed citizens are willing to trade their privacy for common goods such as COVID-19 suppression. But low case numbers and cautionary public discourses can make trustworthiness difficult to establish because some will only do so when it can be demonstrated that the benefits justify the costs to individuals. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10728-021-00441-1.

Effectiveness evaluation of digital contact tracing for COVID-19 in New South Wales, Australia

“…Data security concerns, namely lack of privacy and fearing the normalisation of governmental tracking; functionality issues, in particular the negative effect on smartphone performance through increased battery usage; and privacy considerations due to the need for a centralised database, which is an integral design feature of tracing apps based on the centralised approach, were identified early as potential barriers for acceptance of the COVIDSafe app. 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 …”

Effectiveness of digital contact tracing for COVID-19 in New South Wales, Australia

“…Data security concerns, namely lack of privacy and fearing the normalization of governmental tracking; functionality issues, in particular negative impact on phone performance through increased battery usage; and privacy considerations due to the need for a centralized database, which is an integral design feature of tracing applications based on the centralized approach, were identified early as a potential barrier for acceptance of the COVIDSafe app. (19)(20)(21)(22)(23) Second, with a positive predictive value below 40% and an estimated sensitivity of 15%, the diagnostic performance of the app was not sufficiently high to add value for COVID-19 contact tracing in NSW. Given that the app is intended to complement rather than to replace conventional contact tracing, a modest sensitivity might have been acceptable, particularly since some exposure settings were judged to be high risk and broader close contact criteria were applied.…”

“…Data security concerns, namely lack of privacy and fearing the normalization of governmental tracking; functionality issues, in particular negative impact on phone performance through increased battery usage; and privacy considerations due to the need for a centralized database, which is an integral design feature of tracing applications based on the centralized approach, were identified early as a potential barrier for acceptance of the COVIDSafe app. (19-23)…”

Delineating privacy aspects of COVID tracing applications embedded with proximity measurement technologies & digital technologies

“…For instance, data flow and storage have been restricted as a result of the Commonwealth Government's legislation. The COVID-19 Safe Bill 2020, introduced by the Australian government, forbids any entity to force anyone to use the app for any reason [ 116 ]. The GDPR, or General Data Protection Regulation, is one of the most well-known and widely recognized data protection laws in the world.…”