Sharing carbon permits in industrial symbiosis: A game theory-based optimisation model

Fadzil, Faris Ahmad; Andiappan, Viknesh; Ng, Denny K. S.; Ng, Law Yong; Hamid, Anuar

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.131820

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Regarding the research assumptions, this paper draws on the study of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory method [ 58 , 59 ] to propose the assumptions. Yu et al assume that the blue carbon production cost of the ocean ranching enterprise as a quadratic function of the blue carbon output [ 56 ], which is the same as this research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cooperative game theory results show that each factory earns an average profit of 12% when sharing its carbon credits. Compared to working independently, plants are 25% more profitable when working in a coalition [ 51 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Blue carbon demand enterprises buy the blue carbon emission rights through trading platform. Drawing on research of non-cooperative game and cooperative game method [ 58 , 59 ], this paper assumes that blue carbon demand enterprise's cost function is

and the benefit function is

, where

is the blue carbon utility coefficient of the demand enterprise.…”

Section: Model Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Can multi-agent cooperation promote the ecological value realization of blue carbon in marine ranching?

Zhang

Cheng

Zheng

2023

Heliyon

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

and the benefit function is

, where

is the blue carbon utility coefficient of the demand enterprise.…”

Section: Model Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Can multi-agent cooperation promote the ecological value realization of blue carbon in marine ranching?

Zhang

Cheng

Zheng

2023

Heliyon

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…On the other hand, in case when the FWEIP is formed by multiple individual entities, the outcome of the SSI can be used as a guide for further cooperative negotiations. For example, despite not covered in the scope of this work, the index can be used as a referenced indicator for fair distribution of profit sharing (e.g., greater share of profit is allocated for entity that play a more pivotal role) among multiple involved parties (e.g., shown in the work conducted by Fadzil et al, (2022)).…”

Section: Implication and Limitation Of The Fweip Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shapley-Shubik Agents Within Superstructure-Based Recycling Model: Circular Economy Approaches for Fish Waste Eco-Industrial Park

Tan,

Uthayakumar,

Yeo

et al. 2024

Process Integr Optim Sustain

Self Cite

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The tremendous production of fish has resulted in an increased fish waste generation, which ultimately led to the current triple planetary crises on climate, biodiversity, and pollution. In this study, a Fish Waste-based Eco-Industrial Park (FWEIP) model is developed in an attempt to convert the linear economy in existing fish waste management into a circular economy model. Process Graph (P-graph) is used for combinatorial optimization to synthesize optimal FWEIP with the consideration of economic and environmental aspects. The model favors the production of biofuel using the gasification process (Rank 1) with a promising economic benefit of $2.28 million/y without proposing circular synergy within the FWEIP ecosystem. On the other hand, suboptimal solutions—suboptimal 1 (black soldier fly (BSF)) and suboptimal 2 (pyrolysis and gasification) solutions—exhibit gross profit of 17.98% and 24.12% lower than that of the optimal solution. Both suboptimal solutions offer greater circularity with self-sustaining resources (e.g., fish feed, chitosan, and energy). The sensitivity analysis indicates the potential debottlenecking of suboptimal 2 with the use of a catalyst to improve the conversion of bio-oil in the pyrolysis pathway and exhibits a gross profit of 22.54% higher than that of the optimal solution. Following the Shapley-Shubik power index analysis, the hydroponics facility is identified as the pivotal player for both optimal and suboptimal 2 cases with the exception of suboptimal 1 indicating both BSF and hydroponics as a pivotal player. In brief, this research provides the fish waste-based industry with insights and strategies for the implementation of a circular economy as a step toward sustainable development.

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“…Te supervision standard of the government civil afairs department is the national guidance on the operation of smart community. In comparison, it can play a positive role in correction, which is a kind of top-down communication [25]. At the same time, smart community should also make clear the dissatisfaction and desire of smart community residents to demand, provide more efcient institutional services, and seek their own development with a bottom-up feedback mechanism [26].…”

Section: Strategies For Institutional Behavior Improvement Formentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Game Behavior of Smart Community Regulatory Participants to Co-Create the Smart City: Post-Human Stakeholder Perspectives

Wan

Yin

2023

Health & Social Care in the Community

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The sustainable development of smart community is the key to China’s grassroots governance and also the general trend of China’s urban modernization. In the supervision of the smart community, the optimization of the behavior of the regulatory subject cannot be separated. Previous studies have focused more on how subjects participate in supervision and less on the behavior of stakeholders in the game. This paper analyzes the game behavior of regulatory participants in the process of sustainable development of smart community and studies the optimization strategy of regulatory behavior according to the game behavior logic among participants. The results show the following. (i) Government behavior plays a leading role in supervision. (ii) When the government invests resources in the screening of third-party evaluation agencies and service purchase and mainly adopts policy punishment methods for stakeholders with rent-seeking behavior, the probability of regulatory participation stakeholders’ positive behavior is the greatest. (iii) The improvements should be made from the aspects of information network construction, the refinement of reward and punishment measures, and the improvement of evaluation party access rules. This not only helps to enhance the good supervision situation of the supervision enthusiasm of the participants but also can realize the self-discipline operation of the smart community and enhance the responsibility consciousness of the evaluation institutions.

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Sharing carbon permits in industrial symbiosis: A game theory-based optimisation model

Cited by 11 publications

References 34 publications

Can multi-agent cooperation promote the ecological value realization of blue carbon in marine ranching?

Can multi-agent cooperation promote the ecological value realization of blue carbon in marine ranching?

Shapley-Shubik Agents Within Superstructure-Based Recycling Model: Circular Economy Approaches for Fish Waste Eco-Industrial Park

Analysis of the Game Behavior of Smart Community Regulatory Participants to Co-Create the Smart City: Post-Human Stakeholder Perspectives

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