Self-Knowing Agents

O’Brien, Lucy

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001

Cited by 114 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Dentro de estas teorías podemos distinguir entre las que argumentan que ser autor conlleva expresar los propios valores en las acciones, desvelar el "verdadero yo", y las teoría que aducen que ser autor consiste en responder de determinada manera a las razones que justifican las propias acciones o estados mentales (véase Vargas, 2009 para un análisis comparativo entre estas dos teorías). Como veremos, Moran defiende una teoría atribucionista basada en la capacidad del agente de hacer que sus estados mentales y sus acciones respondan a sus razones; se sitúa por lo tanto en la misma línea que Pettit y Smith (1996), Scanlon (1998), O'Brien (2007) y Hieronymi (2008, entre otros.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Responsabilidad, Autoría Y Voluntad: La Propuesta De Moran

Corral

2015

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Resumen: Este artículo plantea tres objeciones a la propuesta de Richard Moran acerca de la relación entre razones y responsabilidad. En primer lugar, mostraré que la relación entre razones y responsabilidad que presenta Moran es problemática, por dos razones: primero, las creencias alienadas del agente pueden ser parte del razonamiento; y segundo, las llamadas razones de estado no cumplen el Principio de Transparencia, pero no eximen de responsabilidad. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que la propuesta atribucionista de Moran postula una relación demasiado exigente entre estados mentales y razonamiento. Tercero, señalaré la dificultad de la propuesta de Moran para recoger la intuición de que tanto la autoría como la responsabilidad se presentan en grados.Palabras clave: Responsabilidad, Razones normativas, Autoría, Richard Moran.Abstract: This article presents three objections to Richard Moran's proposal concerning the relation between reasons and responsibility. First, I will show that the relation between reasons and responsibility suggested by Moran is problematic, for two reasons. On the one hand, alienated beliefs can play a role in the reasoning process. On the other hand, state-given reasons do not meet the Transparency Condition, but they do not exempt the agent either. Second, I will argue that the relation between attitudes and reasons that Moran postulates is too demanding. Third, I will point out that Moran's account cannot accommodate the intuition that both responsibility and authorship come in degrees.

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Section: Introductionunclassified

Responsabilidad, Autoría Y Voluntad: La Propuesta De Moran

Corral

2015

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“…18 ff.). 6 Including McDowell (1998), Peacocke (1999) and O'Brien (2007. Descartes (1985a) also seems to be committed to this claim (see Sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging as a non-voluntary action

McHugh

2009

Philos Stud

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Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.

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“…Section 2 articulates a justification for this 1 The argument is central in Campbell (1994). The idea that first-person thoughts are governed by a simple rule is also prominent in O'Brien (2007) and Peacocke (2008). It is the transposition to the domain of thought of the Kaplanian orthodoxy according to which the first-person in language is governed by the rule that any utterance of it will refer to the utterer.…”

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“…Nothing I say in this paper is incompatible with this being the right thing to say about the first-person in language. 2 The problem cases are discussed in Campbell (1994), and developed further in O'Brien (2007). dissatisfaction by explaining why there is no version of The Simple Rule Model that is both plausible and explanatory.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought

Morgan

2014

Philos Stud

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What determines the reference of first-person thoughts-thoughts that one would express using the first-person pronoun? I defend a model on which our ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves do, in much the way that our ways of gaining knowledge of objects in the world determine the reference of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. This model-the Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought-can be motivated by reference to independently plausible general principles about how reference is determined. But it faces a serious objection. There seems to be an explanatory rival to it with a great deal of plausiblility. The rival is The Simple Rule Model, which says that first-person thoughts are governed by the simple rule that any token of one will be about the person whose token it is. I pinpoint a crucial unclarity in The Simple Rule Model, hinging on how we understand the notion of a rule, and argue that no version of the Simple Rule Model is both plausible and a genuine explanatory rival to the Demonstrative Model. I also provide an argument that the Demonstrative Model is extensionally adequate.

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Self-Knowing Agents

Cited by 114 publications

References 73 publications

Responsabilidad, Autoría Y Voluntad: La Propuesta De Moran

Responsabilidad, Autoría Y Voluntad: La Propuesta De Moran

Judging as a non-voluntary action

The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought

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