Resumen: Este artículo plantea tres objeciones a la propuesta de Richard Moran acerca de la relación entre razones y responsabilidad. En primer lugar, mostraré que la relación entre razones y responsabilidad que presenta Moran es problemática, por dos razones: primero, las creencias alienadas del agente pueden ser parte del razonamiento; y segundo, las llamadas razones de estado no cumplen el Principio de Transparencia, pero no eximen de responsabilidad. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que la propuesta atribucionista de Moran postula una relación demasiado exigente entre estados mentales y razonamiento. Tercero, señalaré la dificultad de la propuesta de Moran para recoger la intuición de que tanto la autoría como la responsabilidad se presentan en grados.Palabras clave: Responsabilidad, Razones normativas, Autoría, Richard Moran.Abstract: This article presents three objections to Richard Moran's proposal concerning the relation between reasons and responsibility. First, I will show that the relation between reasons and responsibility suggested by Moran is problematic, for two reasons. On the one hand, alienated beliefs can play a role in the reasoning process. On the other hand, state-given reasons do not meet the Transparency Condition, but they do not exempt the agent either. Second, I will argue that the relation between attitudes and reasons that Moran postulates is too demanding. Third, I will point out that Moran's account cannot accommodate the intuition that both responsibility and authorship come in degrees.
Excuses and exempting conditions aim to mitigate responsibility. This paper proposes a distinction between excuses and exemptions in terms of the distinctive kind of judgement each of them aims to respond. I argue that exemptions affect the explanatory relevance of the accused, while excuses fully or partially justify her, by affecting the evaluative claim involved in responsibility attributions. This distinction supports the claim that attributing responsibility is a two-step process, each of them corresponding to a different kind of responsibility-agential and moral-whose attribution is guided by two different although related cognitive and argumentative tasks: explaining an outcome, and evaluating its moral significance.Keywords: moral responsibility, explanatory judgements, excuses, exempting conditions.
ResumenLas excusas y las condiciones eximentes tienen como finalidad mitigar la responsabilidad. Este artículo propone una distinción entre excusas y eximentes basada en el tipo distintivo de juicio que cada una trata de responder. Argumento que los eximentes afectan la relevancia causal del acusado, mientras que las excusas lo justifican total o parcialmente, porque afectan al juicio evaluativo implícito en las atribuciones de responsabilidad. Esta distinción apoya una concepción de las atribuciones de responsabilidad como un proceso en dos etapas, donde cada
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