The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought

Morgan, Daniel

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0391-z

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In describing what I call the "indexical model", I am not aiming for exegetical accuracy, but trying instead to characterise a possible view which accounts for the Thinker Intuition along the model suggested by the word "I" -a view whose core ideas are in fact accepted, explicitly or more often implicitly, by many. 8 I won't discuss other existing views of the concept of self, such as the demonstrative models of Evans (1982) and Morgan (2015), the no-reference stance of Anscombe (1975), the relativist approaches of Lewis (1979) and others, or the mental-file models of Perry (2002) and Recanati (2012, Part VIII). Such a survey would take me too far beyond the goal of this essay, which is to propose the phenomenal model as a possible new way to flesh out to the Thinker Intuition.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection

Guillot

2016

Philosophical Explorations

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The indexical word "I" has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts, or more generally phenomenally-grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the concept of self, namely its "super-reflexivity": to use this concept isn't just to think of oneself, but to think of oneself as the thinker of the present thought. I call this familiar observation the "Thinker Intuition". I review some shortcomings of the indexical model of the concept of self, which is the classical account of the Thinker Intuition. I go on to propose a different account, the "phenomenal model", according to which the concept of self is a phenomenally-grounded concept, anchored in a generic kind of cognitive phenomenology: the phenomenology of intellection.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection

Guillot

2016

Philosophical Explorations

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“…it does not seem possible for me to be mistaken about when the sun is shining; that is, it seems impossible for me to misidentify the time I am thinking about (although I could be wrong about whether the heat is sun ). In Section 3, we saw that perceptual‐demonstrative judgements are IEM, and some writers, for example, Evans (1982), Morgan (2015), have therefore argued for a perceptual‐demonstrative account of ‘I’. Thus, one might wonder: are ‘now’‐thoughts perceptual‐demonstrative thoughts based on the thinker's experience of now?…”

Section: ‘Now’‐utterances and Iemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Now‐thoughts

Romdenh‐Romluc

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Now'-thoughts are often categorised alongside 'I'-thoughts.The word 'I'-(including its counterparts in other languages) and the thoughts typically expressed with it have long been a source of fascination for philosophers. 'I'seemingly behaves in peculiar ways, which many writers take to reflect some interesting features of the thoughts it typically expresses. Whilst the similarities between the behaviour of 'I'and 'now'have often been noted, the latter has received much less attention in the literature. In this paper, I will take some of the most influential ideas and frameworks that have been used to analyse 'I'-thought and draw on phenomenological descriptions of temporal experience to provide an account of 'now'thought. I will argue that a certain important class of 'now'-thoughts do not involve thinking about a particular time and predicating something of it, but instead merely involve registering the presence of events. I will end by sketching an account of how these claims might sit with a theory of the word 'now'. | INTRODUCTIONWhat kind of thoughts are typically expressed by sentences such as 'the meeting is starting now' and 'now my daughter is six years old'? One might think the answer is obvious. The word 'now' refers to a particular time, and a 'now'-utterance says that something is happening then. Correspondingly, the thought expressed involves thinking of a particular time and predicating something of it. However, I will argue that matters are not so simple.'Now'-thoughts are often categorised alongside 'I'-thoughts. The word 'I' (including its counterparts in other languages) and the thoughts typically expressed with it have long been a source of fascination for philosophers.'I' seemingly behaves in peculiar ways, which many writers take to reflect some interesting features of the thoughts it typically expresses. Whilst writers such as Castañeda (1966, 1967, 1969) and Perry (1977Perry ( , 1979 have pointed out similarities between the behaviour of 'I' and 'now', the latter has received much less attention in the literature. 1 In this study, I will take some of the most influential ideas and frameworks that have been used to analyse 'I'-thought

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“…23 See Campbell (1994) andO'Brien (2007, chapter 3). 24 See, for instance, Campbell (1994), O'Brien (2007) and (1995, Morgan (2015), Peacocke (2008Peacocke ( , 2014.…”

Section: Basic Principle Of Acquaintance (Bpa)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Principles of Acquaintance

Pepp¹

2019

Acquaintance

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The thesis that in order to genuinely think about a particular object one must be (in some sense) acquainted with that object has been thoroughly explored since it was put forward by Bertrand Russell. Recently, the thesis has come in for mounting criticism. The aim of this chapter is to point out that neither the exploration nor the criticism have been sensitive to the fact that the thesis can be interpreted in two different ways, yielding two different principles of acquaintance. One principle uses the notion of content in distinguishing genuine thinking-about things from a merely derivative kind of thinking-about things. The other principle is quiet about content, focusing instead on a distinction between satisfactional and non-satisfactional means of bringing things into thought. I shall argue that the latter principle merits independent assessment as part of the broader effort to account for genuine thinking about particular objects.

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The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought

Cited by 9 publications

References 11 publications

Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection

Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection

Now‐thoughts

Principles of Acquaintance

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