“…Our explanation would vindicate Compatibility, but then Filter Failure 1 and 1* would both be false and desire‐manipulation wouldn't be a problem at all insofar as perceptual justification is concerned. Similar points apply to the alternative explanations of Compatibility provided by Chudnoff () and Skene (). It's hard to see how, even in principle, we could explain Compatibility while allowing desire‐manipulation to pose a special obstacle to perceptual justification.…”
Section: The Same Cognitive Penetration Problemssupporting
Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a problem, you do too (well, most of you anyway). Reliabilists have denounced dogmatism's cognitive penetration problems, but they have problems with cognitive penetration that are even worse.Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. 1 But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-manipulated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem.Yet before you mock the speck in the dogmatist's eye, be sure that you don't have a plank in your own. Reliabilists, such as Alvin Goldman and Jack Lyons, have been quick to pounce on dogmatism for its implications regarding cognitive penetration, and Lyons has gone so far as to declare that reliabilism has special virtues on this topic. The truth, however, is that reliabilists have cognitive penetration problems that are even worse than those (allegedly) faced by the
“…Our explanation would vindicate Compatibility, but then Filter Failure 1 and 1* would both be false and desire‐manipulation wouldn't be a problem at all insofar as perceptual justification is concerned. Similar points apply to the alternative explanations of Compatibility provided by Chudnoff () and Skene (). It's hard to see how, even in principle, we could explain Compatibility while allowing desire‐manipulation to pose a special obstacle to perceptual justification.…”
Section: The Same Cognitive Penetration Problemssupporting
Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a problem, you do too (well, most of you anyway). Reliabilists have denounced dogmatism's cognitive penetration problems, but they have problems with cognitive penetration that are even worse.Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. 1 But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-manipulated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem.Yet before you mock the speck in the dogmatist's eye, be sure that you don't have a plank in your own. Reliabilists, such as Alvin Goldman and Jack Lyons, have been quick to pounce on dogmatism for its implications regarding cognitive penetration, and Lyons has gone so far as to declare that reliabilism has special virtues on this topic. The truth, however, is that reliabilists have cognitive penetration problems that are even worse than those (allegedly) faced by the
“…Some construe intellectual seemings as inclinations to believe (Sosa, , Swinburne, ). However, I am persuaded by arguments given by Michael Huemer against this version of the view and think that intellectual seemings are best understood as being experiences with propositional content, and a characteristic belief‐like or judgment‐like phenomenology (see Bealer, ; Cullison, ; Huemer, ; Skene, ; Tucker, ) . Somogy Varga offers the following helpful description: Different from the inclination to believe P, or the belief that P, a seeming that P refers to a state with a certain phenomenal character that “recommends” or “assures” us that its propositional content is true (Tucker, ).…”
Section: Intellectual Seemingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some construe intellectual seemings as inclinations to believe (Sosa, 1998, Swinburne, 2001. However, I am persuaded by arguments given by Michael Huemer against this version of the view 6 and think that intellectual seemings are best understood as being experiences with propositional content, and a characteristic belief-like or judgment-like phenomenology (see Bealer, 2000;Cullison, 2010;Huemer, 2007;Skene, 2013;Tucker, 2010). 7 Somogy Varga offers the following helpful description:…”
The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.
“…The self-defeat argument (see Huemer 2001and especially 2007, and Skene 2013 aims to conclude, not just that (PC) is true, but rather that the belief that (PC) is false cannot be doxastically justified. The reasoning runs roughly as follows: (i) if S believed that P (where P stands for almost any proposition including the one that (PC) is false), S would do so on the basis of S's seeming that P, or on the basis of S's seeming that Q, where P has been inferred by S from Q.…”
Section: Arguments In Support Of (Pc)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For further criticism see DePaul (2009) and Conee (2013). See Huemer (2009 and Skene (2013) for responses.…”
Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006, 2011, 2014). 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows: (PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5 Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 6 1 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. 2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a). 3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.
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