If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too

Tucker, Chris

doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12050

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(78 reference statements)

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“…Even if background beliefs play a role in generating your experience, that need not imply that they play a role in justifying any of your beliefs justified by your experience (for further discussion, see Siegel or Tucker ).…”

Section: The Epistemic Consequences Of Affirming Cognitive Penetrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Your sunglasses causally affect your experiences, but none of your perceptual beliefs are justified to any extent by your sunglasses. (2000: 540) Even if background beliefs play a role in generating your experience, that need not imply that they play a role in justifying any of your beliefs justified by your experience ( for further discussion, see Siegel 2012or Tucker 2014.…”

Section: What Theories Are Affected By Epistemically Negative Cases Omentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception

Silins

2016

Philosophy Compass

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If our experiences are cognitively penetrable, they can be influenced by our antecedent expectations, beliefs, or other cognitive states. Theorists such as Churchland, Fodor, Macpherson, and Siegel have debated whether and how our cognitive states might influence our perceptual experiences, as well as how any such influences might affect the ability of our experiences to justify our beliefs about the external world. This article surveys views about the nature of cognitive penetration, the epistemological consequences of denying cognitive penetration, and the epistemological consequences of affirming cognitive penetration.

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Section: The Epistemic Consequences Of Affirming Cognitive Penetrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Theories Are Affected By Epistemically Negative Cases Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception

Silins

2016

Philosophy Compass

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“…For further discussion of the epistemic significance of color memory effects see Jenkin (ms). For more general discussion of the epistemic problems that cognitive penetration apparently gives rise too, see McGrath (), Silins (), Stokes (), Tucker () among others.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

Munton

2017

Philosophical Perspectives

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“…So (PC) seems to commit us -in cases like this -to ascribing too much justification to our beliefs. For responses seeHuemer (2013a) andTucker (2013b).16 For an alternative line of reply see alsoTucker (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Conservatism

Moretti¹

2015

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Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006, 2011, 2014). 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows: (PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5 Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 6 1 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. 2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a). 3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.

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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too

Cited by 22 publications

References 52 publications

Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception

Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

Phenomenal Conservatism

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