“…They collect data from six committees (202 voting questions) from 2003 to 2010 and report the proportion of unanimous, strong majority, and majority outcomes. Urfalino and Costa (2015) show that under simultaneous voting the proportion of unanimous outcomes is lower while the proportion of strong majority outcomes is higher. The authors suggest that these changes are due to reduced expert conformity following the shift to simultaneous voting.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…The FDA's reform of voting procedure in 2007 has been examined in a case study by Urfalino and Costa (2015). They collect data from six committees (202 voting questions) from 2003 to 2010 and report the proportion of unanimous, strong majority, and majority outcomes.…”
We develop a structural model to address the question whether, and to what extent, expert panelists engage in herd behavior when voting on important policy questions. Our data comes from FDA advisory committees voting on questions concerning the approval of new drug applications. We utilize a change in the voting procedure from sequential to simultaneous voting to identify herding. Estimates suggest that around half of the panelists are willing to vote against their private assessment if votes from previous experts indicate otherwise and, on average, 9 percent of the sequential votes are actual herd-votes. Temporary committee members are more prone to herding than regular (standing) members. We find that simultaneous voting improves information aggregation given our estimates.
“…They collect data from six committees (202 voting questions) from 2003 to 2010 and report the proportion of unanimous, strong majority, and majority outcomes. Urfalino and Costa (2015) show that under simultaneous voting the proportion of unanimous outcomes is lower while the proportion of strong majority outcomes is higher. The authors suggest that these changes are due to reduced expert conformity following the shift to simultaneous voting.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…The FDA's reform of voting procedure in 2007 has been examined in a case study by Urfalino and Costa (2015). They collect data from six committees (202 voting questions) from 2003 to 2010 and report the proportion of unanimous, strong majority, and majority outcomes.…”
We develop a structural model to address the question whether, and to what extent, expert panelists engage in herd behavior when voting on important policy questions. Our data comes from FDA advisory committees voting on questions concerning the approval of new drug applications. We utilize a change in the voting procedure from sequential to simultaneous voting to identify herding. Estimates suggest that around half of the panelists are willing to vote against their private assessment if votes from previous experts indicate otherwise and, on average, 9 percent of the sequential votes are actual herd-votes. Temporary committee members are more prone to herding than regular (standing) members. We find that simultaneous voting improves information aggregation given our estimates.
“…However, while cue‐taking is beneficial if it allows less informed voters to gain easily accessible information and profit from the knowledge of fellow citizens, it is detrimental to equality to the extent that it perpetuates informational asymmetry (Bentham 1999: 107; Urfalino and Costa 2015: 170). The following thus guides our investigation:E3a: Collective voting enables at least some citizens to engage in cue‐taking.E3b: Cue‐taking under collective voting is used more often by less informed citizens and/or members of less powerful groups.…”
This paper assesses collective voting as a specific mode of democratic decision-making and compares it to secret voting. Under collective voting, voters gather in one place and decide by the show of hands. We theorise two potential advantages and two disadvantages of collective voting so defined. We then draw on original survey data from one of the largest polities practising collective voting, the citizen assembly of the Swiss canton of Glarus. We find that both the promises and pitfalls of non-secret voting are exaggerated. Non-secret voting's suspected pitfallssocial pressure and abstentiondo not generally materialise in our sample, although for women they do appear to be relevant to some extent. However, the promises of collective votingenabling cue-taking and discursive bridging and bondingare equally realised to a limited extent only. Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die kollektive Stimmabgabe bei demokratischen Entscheidfindungen im Vergleich zur geheimen Stimmabgabe. Bei kollektiven Abstimmungen versammeln sich die Stimmenden an einem Ort und geben ihre Stimme offen und gleichzeitig ab: Das heisst, dass jede Person sehen kann, wie die anderen abstimmen, und ihrerseits von allen anderen bei der Stimmabgabe gesehen werden kann. Der Beitrag diskutiert zwei theoretische Gefahrensozialen Druck und Stimmenthaltungund zwei theoretische Chancendie M€ oglichkeit zum Cue-Taking und die St€ arkung des Sozialkapitals durch Bridging and Bondingeiner solchen kollektiven Stimmabgabe. Anhand von Umfragedaten aus dem Landsgemeindekanton Glarus nehmen wir eine empirische € Uberpr€ ufung der theoretischen Erwartungen vor. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sowohl die Vor-als auch die Nachteile des nichtgeheimen Abstimmens € ubersch€ atzt werden. Die vermuteten Gefahren von nichtgeheimer Stimmabgabe spielen in unserem Sample zwar eine gewisse Rolle bei weiblichen Stimmberechtigten, lassen sich aber nicht generell feststellen. Umgekehrt werden allerdings auch die erhofften Vorteile kollektiver Stimmabgabe nur in beschr€ anktem Mass realisiert. R esum e: Cet article analyse le vote collectif comme modalit e de prise de d ecision d emocratique et le compare au vote secret. Le vote collectif se caract erise par le fait que les electeurs se r eunissent au même endroit et votent a la fois publiquement et simultan ement. Cela veut dire que, non seulement, chaque electeur peut observer comment votent les autres, mais aussi que ces derniers peuvent observer comment l' electeur exprime ses choix politiques. L'article discute d'abord deux risquesla pression sociale et l'abstentionet deux avantages potentielsla possibilit e de s'informer aupr es des autres au moment du vote (cue-taking) et le renforcement des liens sociaux (bridging and bonding)du vote collectif. Nous menons ensuite une analyse statistique a partir des r eponses tir ees d'un sondage men e dans le canton de Glaris, qui pratique la Landsgemeinde. Nos r esultats montrent que les craintes comme les espoirs visa -vis du vote collectif sont exag er es. Notre ech...
“…However, the actual number of permanent members is typically lower 41 Prior to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 the voting was sequential. Throughout the second half 2007, voting by "a show of hands" was replaced by a mechanical device whereby each member votes independently (Urfalino and Costa (2013)).…”
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