Salience and Complexity in Supranational Policymaking: The Case of Subnational Interests

Abstract

This study examined whether Gormley's insights about the effects of public salience and technical complexity on the patterns of participation in the regulatory process have explanatory power in an international setting. Specifically, I tracked 60 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission and estimated the change made by the supranational technocrats in response to the requests of subnational politicians. I found support for the theoretical propositions about the differentiated effect of salience and complexity on political and administrative actors. Consistent with the notion of bureaucratic expertise, the Commission is less responsive when the policy issues require expertise to be tackled efficiently. Although the European Union has been pursuing various mechanisms to democratize its policy process, the technical character of supranational regulation precludes the broader public and elected politicians from assuming a larger role and bureaucracy will continue to be a major player in the international arena.

Regional Voices in the European Union: Subnational Influence in Multilevel Politics

“…While central government helpfulness is unrelated to lobbying success directly in Brussels, CoR helpfulness only significantly increases lobbying success in Model 4 but loses significance in the more controlled setting of Model 5 and therefore should be considered with caution. This is in line with past findings, highlighting that influence via the CoR is conditioned by a number of specific factors (Hönnige and Panke ; Neshkova ).…”

“…Finally, as it is their formal and institutionalized access point in the EU's policy‐making process, I identify the Committee of the Regions (CoR) as the third key policy ally. Indeed, recent research has found that despite disappointed expectations, the CoR has been able to influence the EU's legislative process, albeit under certain specific conditions (Hönnige and Panke ; Neshkova ).…”

Explaining Participation Bias in the European Commission's Online Consultations: The Struggle for Policy Gain without too Much Pain

“…Our reasoning is in line with Gormley () who hypothesizes that different actors’ participation in regulatory politics across policy areas is conditional on the areas’ levels of public salience and technical complexity. In other words, different combinations of salience and complexity will lead to different participation patterns (Neshkova, ). Similarly, we expect that different combinations of salience and complexity lead to different levels of participation bias.…”

The Power Dynamics of Mandated Network Administrative Organizations

“…These propositions related to sector‐based differences among mandated network NAOs resonate with Gormley's () salience and complexity model (Koliba et al ; Neshkova ), which poses that salience (an issue that raises the layperson's interest) and complexity (an issue that requires a high degree of expertise) determines which actors will have the lead in a policy regime. Salient issues will be closely managed by elected politicians, while complex issues will be delegated to specialized bureaucrats.…”