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Qualitative evidence from action networks is used to answer the research question, How do leaders of successful networks manage collaboration challenges to make things happen? This study of two urban immigration coalitions in the United States found that their leaders developed practices as a response to two paradoxical requirements of network collaboration: managing unity and diversity when doing inward work and confrontation and dialogue when doing outward work. By illuminating how leaders responded to these complex demands inherent in action networks, the authors open up the black box of managing whole networks of organizations and underscore the role of leadership in interorganizational collaboration.

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Research Question/Issue In this comprehensive literature review, we synthesize and analyze the current state of academic research regarding the relatively understudied relationship between the type of owners and board governance. Research Findings/Insights Our review of the existing literature at the intersection of ownership and board governance research discusses how six distinct ownership types—pertaining to family, lone founder, corporation, institutional investor, state, and venture capitalist—shape board governance, defined as board structure, composition, and processes. We also uncover the influence of ownership type on board functional performance (i.e., monitoring, resource provision, and strategic involvement) and the implications of these owner–board relationships for a variety of firm outcomes (related to performance and compliance). Theoretical/Academic Implications We present identifiable patterns in board governance and functional performance associated with each ownership type and their respective implications for a wide range of firm outcomes. We then propose seven core emerging themes that deserve further scholarly attention. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our analysis cautions against the application of the “one‐size‐fits‐all” best‐practices approach in board governance advocated by policy makers, scholars, and corporate governance activists and underscores the need to consider the contingent effects of different owners' behaviors and interests in shaping and assessing board governance.

In understanding what drives the development of network administrative organizations (NAOs) in mandated networks, power bargaining is central. Th e authors execute a comparative longitudinal case study of NAOs in two policy-mandated networks. Th e article focuses specifi cally on the role of power in these developments and concludes that diff erences in NAO development arise from power dependencies, which are attributable in part to sector characteristics. It is proposed that mandated network members' greater interdependence and greater dependence on external nonmembers, as well as whole network dependence on external actors, partly determine mandated networks' NAO design. Th ese networks will have larger and more capable NAOs (with more staff ), accept sharing control of the NAO executive with the mandating party, and have broader responsibilities.