Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are considered important intermediaries between citizens and policymakers. They are assumed to function as transmission belts that filter societal preferences and channel them to policymakers. Although the ability of CSOs to connect civil society with policymakers has been put into question, it has rarely been theoretically specified and empirically tested. This paper develops a conceptualization of CSOs that examines their capacity to function as transmission belts. It does so by distinguishing two organizational dimensions related to member involvement and organizational capacity. The paper draws on a large survey of CSOs active at the EU to empirically assess these organizational dimensions and relate them to basic CSOs' characteristics. The findings indicate that one out of three organizations approximates the ideal-type transmission belt. The findings contribute to a better understanding and assessment of CSO's potential contribution to policy-making in representative democracies.

Since the onset of the Great Recession, "doing more with less" has become a policy mantra. To do more with less, a range of governments have concurrently imposed wage cuts and greater work demands on public employees. This article assesses the impact of these changes on the job satisfaction and work motivation of public employees in 34 European countries. Congruent with previous studies linking income and working hours with job attitudes, the article finds a negative impact on both. There are no free austerity lunches: while public employees may work longer hours for lower pay, they are less satisfied and less motivated when doing so. One caveat applies: the effect on motivation-although not satisfaction-is mitigated when employees feel that their values are aligned with those of their organization. This puts a premium on public managers fostering value alignment, particularly when it is hardest to achieve: in times of cutbacks. Practitioner Points• Pay cuts and enhanced workloads have a significant negative effect on job satisfaction and motivation across public sectors. • If employees perceive that their personal values are aligned with their jobs, the effects of negative working conditions on motivation are attenuated. • Public sector leaders should put a premium on measures to strengthen value alignment, particularly when it is arguably hardest to achieve: in times of cutbacks.

The European Commission's outreach to interest groups implies that they function as ‘transmission belts’ that aggregate and articulate interests as policy‐relevant information for policy‐makers. Operating as a transmission belt, however, requires an organizational design fit for this purpose. We offer one of the first systematic analyses of how organizational design affects interest group access to public officials. We draw from a novel dataset of 248 EU‐level interest groups including data on several dimensions of organizational design. One of our key findings is that qualified majority and consensus‐facilitating decision‐making procedures help interest groups gain access to administrative and political officials, whereas functional differentiation is important to get access to administrative officials, but not to political officials. Our findings thus demonstrate the relevance of organizational design in gaining access as well as the need to incorporate varying informational demands of public officials to properly explain interest group access to public decision‐making.

In understanding what drives the development of network administrative organizations (NAOs) in mandated networks, power bargaining is central. Th e authors execute a comparative longitudinal case study of NAOs in two policy-mandated networks. Th e article focuses specifi cally on the role of power in these developments and concludes that diff erences in NAO development arise from power dependencies, which are attributable in part to sector characteristics. It is proposed that mandated network members' greater interdependence and greater dependence on external nonmembers, as well as whole network dependence on external actors, partly determine mandated networks' NAO design. Th ese networks will have larger and more capable NAOs (with more staff ), accept sharing control of the NAO executive with the mandating party, and have broader responsibilities.

Interest groups are key intermediary actors between civil society and public officials. The EU has long emphasized the importance of interacting with representative groups that involve their members. Additionally, there is an increasing trend toward the professionalization of groups that invest in organizational capacities to efficiently provide policy expertise. Both member involvement and organizational capacity are crucial features for groups to function as transmission belts that aggregate and transfer the preferences of their members to policymakers, thus reinforcing the legitimacy and efficiency of governance systems. Yet, not all groups have these organizational attributes. This paper quantitatively examines the effects of interest groups’ investment in member involvement and organizational capacity on the level of access to EU Commission officials. The results indicate that member involvement does not pay off in terms of higher levels of access. In contrast, groups with high organizational capacities have more meetings with public officials of the Commission.