Rules of Ministerial Recruitment

Abstract

Women's recruitment to ministerial office is improving, but our understanding of what determines women's access to cabinet remains underdeveloped. Comparative studies explain women's ministerial presence through correlations with country-level socio-economic or political factors. This research uses a feminist institutionalist approach to explain gendered access to cabinets. It uses original data from interviews with former ministers and special advisors to map the rules in use of ministerial recruitment. It demonstrates that that women's access to ministerial office is facilitated and constrained by three complexes of predominantly informal rules which structure: who is eligible to be chosen (the eligibility pool); how to qualify (specialist or generalist principles); and who selects ministers (the prime minister or the party). By examining the rules of ministerial recruitment in two Westminster democracies, Australia and the UK, the research demonstrates the differences that exist, even in most similar cases, at system level, at party levels, and over time. By identifying the specific complexes of rules which shape women's access it is possible to identify the rule changes which have been effective in improving women's ministerial opportunities and suggest future reform strategies which would be most effective in the specific context.

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

“…First, ministerial selection discussions and decisions take place in secret, behind closed doors, between a small number of high-level individuals (Annesley 2015). First, ministerial selection discussions and decisions take place in secret, behind closed doors, between a small number of high-level individuals (Annesley 2015).…”

“…Three important aspects of the ministerial selection process mean that it is particularly difficult to examine why ministers get appointed. First, ministerial selection discussions and decisions take place in secret, behind closed doors, between a small number of high-level individuals (Annesley 2015). Second, is not possible to make a realistic assessment of the ministerial selection pool.…”

Corruption and women in cabinets: Informal barriers to recruitment in the executive

“…For example, recent research suggests that there are a number of unwritten rules that shape cabinet formations, one being that an appointed person has demonstrated trustworthiness and allegiance (see Annesley, Beckwith, & Franceschet, ; Franceschet et al, 2017). For instance, Annesley () points out that among the ethos of a cabinet member are loyalty and discretion (p. 631). Similarly, Annesley, Beckwith, and Franceschet () state that “chief executives frequently appoint their most trusted confidantes to cabinet” (p. 11).…”

Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?

“…This study highlights the power of unwritten norms for presidential decisionmaking and therefore contributes to the growing research on informal norms in Latin America and how institutions might be gendered (Annesley 2015;Helmke and Levitsky 2006;Krook and Mackay 2010). Michelle Bachelet may have insisted in 2005 that her ministerial decisions "depend on me.…”

“…2. For the purposes of this article, the supply of ministerial candidates is primarily determined by those who possess PCRs, although other scholars of parliamentary systems continue to debate formal and informal determinants of supply (Annesley 2015).…”