Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Anscombe's Intention

Wiseman, Rachael

doi:10.4324/9781315651187

Cited by 10 publications

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“…An account in which the nature of motivated behavior, or action, takes center stage and that is receiving a growing amount of attention, is Anscombe's (1963;see, e.g., Ford et al, 2011;Schwenkler, 2019;Wiseman, 2017). Anscombe argues that actions have a means-end structure.…”

Section: Motives and The Structure Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the nature of implicit motives

Asma

2022

Theory & Psychology

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David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them has had a substantial influence on contemporary psychology of motivation. He did not, however, reflect on the nature of implicit motives in much detail. In this article, I fill this gap. I argue that implicit motives should not be understood as mental states the agent has no introspective access to. Instead, I propose that the implicit motives that McClelland and others in the field distinguish—the power, achievement, and affiliation motive—are generic descriptions of specific ends an agent may act for. These motives are implicit, because they are not explicitly expressed but merely implied in what the agent does, thinks, and feels. Establishing whether an agent acts for or has a certain implicit motive, then, is a matter of interpreting the agent’s expressions. This proposal is in line with and explains the empirical findings.

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Section: Motives and The Structure Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the nature of implicit motives

Asma

2022

Theory & Psychology

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“…What is Anscombe's form approach? Anscombe's method has long remained unexplored and is only recently the focus of scholarly debate (Haldane, 2020;Ford, 2015;Frey, 2013;Hlobil and Nieswandt, 2016;Stoutland, 2011a;Thompson, 2008;Vogler, 2001;Wiseman, 2016). What is plain in Anscombe's writing is that she pays close attention to what we say, think and do that relates to the topic under consideration.…”

Section: Anscombe's Philosophical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 12 Doing justice to the different interpretations of Anscombe's method, especially exploring whether the approach is confined to Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation (cf. Diamond, 1991Diamond, , 2019Wiseman, 2016) or whether it includes making metaphysical claims (Foot, 2001;Haldane, 2004;Thompson, 2008), would lead too far astray from the question of the relation between rational capacities and psychological processes. Given the claims she makes in Intention-for instance, that she sides with Aquinas in claiming that practical knowledge is the cause of what it understands-I cannot but conclude that she makes metaphysical claims too.…”

Section: Anscombe's Philosophical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anscombe’s Approach to Rational Capacities

Kloosterboer

2022

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

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Reigning orthodoxy in the philosophical study of human rational capacities, such as being able to act intentionally and to reason, is to characterize them in causal psychological terms. That is, to analyze these capacities in terms of mental states and their causal relations. It is against this background that the work of G.E.M. Anscombe has gained renewed interest. The main goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I will explicate Anscombe's philosophical approach by analyzing her account of intentional action and by relating it to the misperceptions of that account in (the history of) the philosophy of action. Importantly, Anscombe holds that an analysis of intentional action in terms of what it is, e.g., an event with certain specific features, cannot provide non-circular explanations. Instead, following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Wittgenstein, Anscombe seeks to explicate intentional action in terms of its form, i.e., the way in which it exists. The second aim of the chapter is to show the import of Anscombe's approach by applying it to the philosophy of reasoning. After discussing two main problems for the current orthodox view in epistemological debates on reasoning, I will propose an alternative Anscombe-inspired view of reasoning. In this so-called form view of reasoning, reasoning is characterized as a tool to drag out implications, embodied in judgments of the form p as following from q. The upshot of the chapter is that concepts of our rational capacities do not depict certain psychological states or processes, but rather our involvement with rational connections that exist in our lives and practices.Many thanks to the organizers and audience of the Women in Parenthesis Workshop (VU Amsterdam, 2019), and to Lieke Asma, Niels van Miltenburg, Dawa Ometto, the editors of this volume and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions.

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“…question is applicable in the other direction, an answer to which gives a means ( §26, 46-47). Secondly, when she talks about practical reasoning, which she thinks necessary for understanding the concept of practical knowledge, her arguments suggest that practical reasoning mostly involves "a calculation of means to ends" ( §38, 73), 4 and practical knowledge seems to be required in this process. Now it is better to take a closer look at the concept of practical knowledge.…”

Section: "The Cause Of What It Understands"mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Content of Practical Knowledge

Chen¹

2021

Journal of Human Cognition

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This paper aims to give a charitable and comprehensible interpretation of the concept of practical knowledge in Intention, G. E. M. Anscombe's famous monograph. In particular, it focuses on her claim that practical knowledge is present even if the agent fails to execute his intention. I argue that (1) a rejection of this claim is unacceptable, and that (2) the content of practical knowledge should be formulated as "I am X-ing", with which this concept can be coherently interpreted.

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Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Anscombe's Intention

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

On the nature of implicit motives

On the nature of implicit motives

Anscombe’s Approach to Rational Capacities

The Content of Practical Knowledge

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