On the nature of implicit motives

Abstract

David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them has had a substantial influence on contemporary psychology of motivation. He did not, however, reflect on the nature of implicit motives in much detail. In this article, I fill this gap. I argue that implicit motives should not be understood as mental states the agent has no introspective access to. Instead, I propose that the implicit motives that McClelland and others in the field distinguish—the power, achievement, and affiliation motive—are generic descriptions of specific ends an agent may act for. These motives are implicit, because they are not explicitly expressed but merely implied in what the agent does, thinks, and feels. Establishing whether an agent acts for or has a certain implicit motive, then, is a matter of interpreting the agent’s expressions. This proposal is in line with and explains the empirical findings.

Depth of the self: Implicit motives and human flourishing. Introduction to the special section

“…And can interpretation be avoided? Asma (2023) argues that the answer to both questions is “no.” In the first part of the article, she critically reflects on the definition that is typically adopted in the literature, that an implicit motive is nonconscious concern, need, or disposition that drives, energizes, directs, and selects behavior toward the attainment of certain classes of goals, incentives, or outcomes. This definition is circular, which means that either the motive or the motivated behavior needs to be defined independently of the other.…”

“…This definition is circular, which means that either the motive or the motivated behavior needs to be defined independently of the other. After rejecting some possible ways to define the implicit motive in terms of a certain kind of psychological state the agent has no introspective access to, Asma (2023) argues that the implicit motives that McClelland and others in the field distinguish—the power, achievement, and affiliation motive—have to be understood in terms of that on the basis of which an implicit motive is ascribed to the agent: the behavior toward the attainment of certain classes of goals, incentives, or outcomes.…”

“…In line with this, Asma (2023) argues (inspired by Anscombean action theory, e.g., Anscombe, 1963) that implicit motives should be understood as generic descriptions, for example, power, under which specific ends—for example, impressing others—an agent may act for fall. An agent acts for an implicit motive if their action can be described in a certain way on a higher level, and they do not realize this.…”

“…As Northoff and Smith (2023) argue, the self should not be understood as an internal phenomenon, but as neuro-ecological. In a similar vein, Asma (2023) sets forth an alternative perspective on implicit motives: instead of seeing them as internal objects, she argues that they are generic descriptions of specific ends an agent may act for. This approach paves the way for a relational account of the self as well, in which how the agent responds in certain contexts, either implicitly or explicitly, is crucial for making sense of who they are and whether they can be seen as a flourishing agent.…”