River coalitions and water trade

Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans‐Peter

doi:10.1093/oep/gpw074

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 38 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Several studies have sought to examine the rise and content of basin-wide agreements. Drawing on game theory, Houba, van Der Lan, and Zeng (2015) and Ansink, Gengenbach, and Weikard (2017) focused on coalition formation in international river basins vis-à-vis water allocation. Both studies found that a grand coalition may not be economically attractive to the riparian states.…”

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both studies found that a grand coalition may not be economically attractive to the riparian states. However, the two analyses used three riparians (Houba et al, 2015) and four riparians (Ansink et al, 2017) through a given geography of the river basin, and symmetry of all riparians vis-à-vis economic and social capacity. Consequently, it is difficult to draw conclusions for basins with more riparians or different basin geographies.…”

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Dinar

Stefano

Nigatu

et al. 2019

Water International

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Examinations of international water treaties suggest that riparian states are not heeding the advice to adopt IWRM. Theories suggest that the larger the number of negotiating states, the lower the cost (per state) of the joint operation of treaties, but the higher the transaction costs of negotiating and maintaining them. We model the trade-off between benefits and costs associated with the number of treaty signatories and apply it to a global treaty dataset. Findings confirm that the transaction costs of negotiation and the economies of scale are important in determining the paucity of basin-wide agreements, the treaties' content and their extent. ARTICLE HISTORYcan contribute to acceptable and effective management of transboundary rivers (in this article we do not address transboundary aquifers), but effectiveness appears to depend on the specific design features of the treaties.Research focusing on international water agreements covering multilateral basins also suggests that treaties that include all the riparian states (basin-wide treaties, such as the 1967 La Plata agreement) are exceptionally rare, existing in only 13% of the world's multilateral basins (Giordano et al., 2013). This finding contradicts the international agencies, environmentalists and engineers who encourage states to negotiate and reach basin-wide agreements to develop the basin in an efficient manner. With the exception of qualitative case studies (Kempkey, Pinard, Pochat, & Dinar, 2009;Waterbury, 2002), there is little systematic empirical analysis of the factors influencing the formation and design of basin-wide accords. Consequently, we are unable to provide policy advice to mediators attempting to promote the formation of basin-wide accords.This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature by attempting to explain the factors accounting for the relatively low number of basin-wide agreements in multilateral basins and for the content of these agreements. Combining theories of international relations and economics, we consider the influence of two factors. The first is the transaction costs of negotiating, enforcing and monitoring treaty commitments among a larger number of signatory riparian states. The second is economies of scale: the benefit of having a large group of states involved in the treaty, which could lower the average cost of the joint activity for each state. We examine the impact of these two factors not only on treaty formation but also on treaty contents, looking at the specific topics and problems addressed in water treaties (or issue areas) and the institutional features. Treaties governing international basins can cover various issues, such as allocating the river's waters, environmental regulation, hydropower generation, groundwater regulation, navigation, fishing, irrigation and infrastructure development. River treaties can also include institutional mechanisms for implementing the treaty and maintaining future cooperation. We examine the influence of economies of scale and transaction costs in the basin-wid...

show abstract

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Dinar

Stefano

Nigatu

et al. 2019

Water International

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Hence, making fair and reasonable allocation rules is key to avoiding such conflict [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. In addition, a few scholars proposed to construct an international water trading market to solve water conflict in transboundary rivers [24][25][26][27][28][29]. However, current studies mostly focus on the physical water to find solutions to water quantity conflict yet ignore the virtual water transfer (VWT) triggered by commodity trade among countries within the same drainage basin.…”

Section: Introduction 1literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis on Management Policies on Water Quantity Conflict in Transboundary Rivers Embedded with Virtual Water—Using Ili River as the Case

et al. 2022

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Current studies neglect how virtual water transfer (VWT) between countries within a drainage basin affects water stress and then yields an invisible effect on the water quantity conflict in transboundary rivers, which would further make management policies on water quantity conflict less fair and reasonable. Therefore, this study first constructs the Inequality Index of VWT and water stress index (WSI) to assess water stress. Next, different types are set according to the Inequality Index and WSI to analyze management policies, with Ili River as the case. Results show: (1) Within the study period, from 1996, the Inequality Index of VWT between China and Kazakhstan stayed at 0.368 (0.368 < 0.5), indicating a relatively high inequality of VWT between the two countries—China at a disadvantage, while Kazakhstan having the upper hand. (2) According to the remotely sensed data, WSI in the riparian zones of the Ili River rose from 0.288 to 0421 in China, and 0214 to 0.402 in Kazakhstan, showing intermediate scarcity. (3) China and Kazakhstan both fall into Type 2, and Kazakhstan has the advantageous position. Therefore, while allocating the water resources of the Ili River, Kazakhstan should lower its expectation and proactively ask to exchange benefits in other aspects to reverse the outward transfer of its physical water. In addition, the two countries should find suitable ways to go about water rights trading to reduce the possibility of potential water quantity conflict.

show abstract

“…Wang et al (2008) use the cooperative game method to realize the optimal reallocation of water resources based on the allocation of initial water rights. Ansink et al (2017) used a cooperative game model to study the stability of water users alliance in international rivers, it was found that if there are four or more agents in the international rivers, there may not be a complete water market. These studies fully show the effectiveness of cooperative game theory in solving the problem of water resource allocation in international rivers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis on competition strategy and regulatory strategy of international river water resources system – with the participation of co-operational agencies

Chen

2022

Water Supply

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In order to reasonably allocate water resources, meet the water demand of water users, and solve the frequent conflicts of water resources in international rivers, this paper explores the optimal regulation strategy of water resources with the participation of co-operational agency based on game model. Our results show that: For water users, the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies affects the competition of water users, and the competition strategies among water users also affect each other. The economic benefits of water resources, water withdrawal costs, fine and honor value all affect the water resources competition strategy of water users. For co-operational agencies, the competition strategy of water users affects the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies. The intensity of penalization and the cost of regulatory have an impact on the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies, but the amount of operation funds of co-operational agencies does not affect its regulatory strategy. The research shows the water resources game process of international rivers with the participation of co-operational agencies, and provides some insights for the water resources regulation of international rivers.

show abstract

River coalitions and water trade

Cited by 12 publications

References 38 publications

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Analysis on Management Policies on Water Quantity Conflict in Transboundary Rivers Embedded with Virtual Water—Using Ili River as the Case

Analysis on competition strategy and regulatory strategy of international river water resources system – with the participation of co-operational agencies

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About