Due to the continuous changes of political environment, consumption habits, technological progress and other factors, the external environment of enterprises is full of uncertainty. The turbulence of external environment is not conducive to the long-term operation and development of enterprises, but also brings great challenges to the selection of suppliers. This makes the competition of enterprises focus on how to choose long-term cooperation suppliers in the uncertain external environment. In addition, due to the deterioration of the global environment, governments pay more and more attention to environmental pollution, and consumers are more and more inclined to green consumption, which makes many companies pay more and more attention to environmental indicators when selecting suppliers. In the case of external environment turbulence and serious environmental pollution, the evaluation and selection of green suppliers in uncertain environment is particularly important for the long-term development of enterprises. What’s more, when the supplier’s capability gap is small, the decision-maker often hesitates among several suppliers. In this paper, the hesitant fuzzy is used to describe the hesitant psychology of decision-makers in selecting suppliers, the variance fluctuation is used to describe the characteristics of hesitant fuzzy numbers, and the probability is used to measure the uncertainty of the environment. A green supplier evaluation model under the uncertainty environment is proposed, which comprehensively evaluates the green suppliers under the uncertain environment. Furthermore, it is compared with other methods that do not consider the uncertainty and the adaptability of evaluation method and right confirmation method, so as to reflect the influence of uncertainty to green supplier evaluation and the importance of adaptability of evaluation method and right confirmation method.

Using the dissipative structure theory (DST), the construction quality management system process of water project in China (WPCQMS) is analyzed in this paper. In the history of development, the process of the participants of WPCQMS gradually undertake quality management responsibility can be divided into the following several major stages: quality self-control stage of construction unit, quality collaborative control stage of owner unit, quality supervision stage of supervision unit, and quality supervision stage of government agency. Furthermore, the existing main problems of WPCQMS are analyzed, and it is put forward that the reforming orientation of WPCQMS should establish the three systems, including the main construction body quality management endurance system, the government quality supervision system, and the social credit assessing system.

In order to reasonably allocate water resources, meet the water demand of water users, and solve the frequent conflicts of water resources in international rivers, this paper explores the optimal regulation strategy of water resources with the participation of co-operational agency based on game model. Our results show that: For water users, the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies affects the competition of water users, and the competition strategies among water users also affect each other. The economic benefits of water resources, water withdrawal costs, fine and honor value all affect the water resources competition strategy of water users. For co-operational agencies, the competition strategy of water users affects the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies. The intensity of penalization and the cost of regulatory have an impact on the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies, but the amount of operation funds of co-operational agencies does not affect its regulatory strategy. The research shows the water resources game process of international rivers with the participation of co-operational agencies, and provides some insights for the water resources regulation of international rivers.