Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?

Kleiboer, Marieke

doi:10.1177/0022343394031001009

Cited by 68 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…*' It should be noted that there is some resistance to the argument that higher costs increase the likelihood of negotiated settlement. Kleiboer (1994), for example, argues that high levels of violence can be a barrier to settlement. Touval and Zartman (2001) argue that when a conflict has reached this point, the conflict has become "twice dominant" in that the original issue needs to be resolved but so too does the animosity the conflict has engendered.…”

Section: Theoretical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

Urlacher

2013

Int Negot

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High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the "hurting-stalemate" logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and nonnegotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The tesults suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes.

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Section: Theoretical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

Urlacher

2013

Int Negot

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“…Realpolitik, rather than with lofty norms and values (Carr 2001(Carr [1939). In the area of peace negotiations, the realist perspective finds expression in Zartman's (1989Zartman's ( [1985) concept of the "ripeness of conflict" (Kleiboer 1994). …”

Section: The Practical Dimension Of Inclusion and Exclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A Framework for Understanding the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations

Lanz

2011

Int Negot

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Who gets a seat at the table and who does not is an important consideration for successful peacemaking. However, current research does not provide sufficient guidance for understanding the politics of participation in peace negotiations. The present article thus develops a conceptual framework for understanding these dynamics. Its central theme is that the inclusion or exclusion of a given actor in peace negotiations is affected by two independent factors. One factor pertains to the practical requirements of the peace process and addresses the following question: does the participation of a given actor augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement?The other factor relates to the normative dimension of peace talks: is the participation of a given actor consistent with the values of international mediators and sponsors of peace negotiations?The article argues that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion result from the interplay of these two factors. The most straightforward situation for mediators is when practical requirements and international norms are mutually reinforcing. Difficulties arise from scenarios where practical effectiveness and norms contradict each other. This is the case when the involvement of a given person (or group) is imperative in terms of the peace process, but difficult to justify politically because this person has committed terrorist acts or is indicted by an international court.

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“…Although many applications of this concept have been tautological (Kleiboer, 1994), such a problem is not inherent. One might conceive that one element of "ripeness" is the willingness of parties to accept diplomacy and/or a willingness to settle.…”

Section: Ripeness and Hurting Stalematesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy

Greig

Diehl

2006

International Interactions

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In this paper, we explore the process by which initially reluctant protagonists come to accept diplomacy to resolve their conflicts; we refer to this as "softening up." Although some studies exploring mediation and negotiation initiation have identified a number of important factors, they have produced largely modest results. These modest findings may reflect the fact that the conditions that promote diplomacy do so only after disputants have been softened up, thereby producing results that are statistically significant, but not substantively strong, unless one controls for a softening effect. In this paper, we develop and test a model of softening up. We do so by studying all pairs of rival states in the period 1946-1995.

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Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?

Cited by 68 publications

References 5 publications

Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

Negotiating with Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?

Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A Framework for Understanding the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations

Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy

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