Revisiting the Coyne Affair: a singular event that changed the course of Canadian monetary history

Siklos, Pierre L.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01603.x

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…When liquidity problems emerged in 1805-1806, however, Bonaparte swiftly reformed the bank by executive fiat, with the governor and vice-governors henceforth being appointed by the head of state. This was an early reminder, as later seen in Canada during the infamous "Coyne affair" at the beginning of the 1960s (Siklos, 2010), that autonomy can always, in reality, be reversed and that even the most statutorily independent central bank remains potentially vulnerable.…”

Section: Measuring Monetary Institutions and Central Bank Independencementioning

confidence: 95%

Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?

Burdekin

Banaian

Hallerberg

et al. 2011

Journal of Financial Economic Policy

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If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. AbstractPurpose -The latest generation of research into macroeconomic policy has turned from more technical aspects of optimal control and expectations formation to consideration of the policymaking institutions themselves. More and more countries have moved towards greater degrees of central bank independence, including many developing economies as well the member countries of the European Central Bank. What still is not generally settled among economists is how to measure the stance of policy and the institutional features of the policymaking process. The purpose of this paper is to assess prevailing monetary and fiscal policies. Design/methodology/approach -The paper takes the form of a review encompassing many different measurements of policy stance and policymaking processes. The authors begin with monetary policy followed by an analysis of central bank institutions. The next sections turn to fiscal policy and the need to adjust budget balance for the state of the business cycle. There is then a brief concluding section. Findings -The authors show in this review that fiscal and monetary rules, and economists' understanding of them, have changed substantially over the years. While on one level there is greater consensus, there have been new questions raised in the process that leave plenty of room for further ongoing research in these key policy areas as well as the optimal design of the design of the monetary and fiscal institutions concerned. Originality/value -The paper provides a review of the existing literature updated and applied with reference to recent events, including the global financial crisis.

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Section: Measuring Monetary Institutions and Central Bank Independencementioning

confidence: 95%

Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?

Burdekin

Banaian

Hallerberg

et al. 2011

Journal of Financial Economic Policy

Self Cite

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“…1 Space limitations prevent delving into the details here, but suffice it to say that Coyne's tenure was marked by major changes in the role and influence of the Bank of Canada (Siklos 2008). As governor, Coyne helped develop a liquid money market, pursued a more activist monetary policy, and was more aggressive and talkative in public than either his predecessor or, for that matter, his contemporaries at other central banks.…”

Section: The 1950s: a Tumultuous Decadementioning

confidence: 99%

“…see Powell 1999), the Bank of Canada actually operated a managed float. The episode in question took place during the tumultuous decade of the 1950s when Canada began to rely on an interest rate instrument, weathered a severe crisis in monetary policy over inflation and how best to control it (Siklos 2008), only to re-enter the Bretton Woods arrangement it helped create in the early 1960s (Muirhead 1999), following another exchange rate crisis, and the resignation of the governor of the Bank of Canada.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not quite as advertised: Canada's managed float in the 1950s and Bank of Canada intervention

Siklos¹

2009

European Review of Economic History

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Canada has perhaps the longest track record of adhering to a floating exchange rate regime, but it may well also have been the first country to adopt a managed float during the 1950s. In spite of criticisms levelled at the Canadian government's decision to float the dollar, the remarkable feature of the behaviour of the exchange rate during the so-called float is the relative stability of the nominal exchange rate, and the small volatility in its movements. This article stresses the impact of foreign exchange intervention in limiting exchange rate appreciations and in moderating exchange rate volatility, using newly found, and heretofore unused, intervention data. Until now, all studies of Canada's experience with the float have relied on official foreign exchange reserves data. A counterfactual experiment also suggests that nominal exchange rate levels, and variability, would have been different had there been no foreign exchange market intervention.

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“…Bordo et al ( 2010 ) andSiklos ( 2010 ) respectively prove by simulations that fi nancial policies after 1957 was too tight.…”

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confidence: 98%