Resisting Scientific Realism

Wray, K. Brad

doi:10.1017/9781108231633

Cited by 39 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…Some do it by inductive reasoning. An inductive version of the “Graveyard” Argument can be found in Brad Wray’s ( 2018 , pp. 68–69) book-length defense of antirealism.…”

Section: The “Graveyard” Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In response, antirealists could appeal to the history of science, and argue, as Wray ( 2018 , p. 43) in fact does, that “the history of science seems to suggest [that] [s]cientists [do] not have […] epistemic privilege.” Indeed, Wray ( 2012 , p. 380) writes that the “no-privilege thesis [that is, (P2) of the Underconsideration Argument] asks us to acknowledge the similarities between current scientists and their predecessors.” He quotes Mary Hesse ( 1976 , p. 266), who argues that the support for the no-privilege premise, that is, (P2) of the Underconsideration Argument, comes from an “induction from the history of science.” In that case, antirealists would be making an inductive argument, similar in structure to the “ Graveyard” Argument (see Sect. 5.1 ), in support of (P2) of the Underconsideration Argument.…”

Section: The Underconsideration Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5.1 on the “ Graveyard” Argument). As many antirealists do, Brad Wray ( 2018 ) also thinks that our current scientific theories will be discarded in the future, but he develops an original argument for this conclusion that, for him, explains why the history of science is marked by discarded or failed theories. According to Wray ( 2018 , p. 187), “the research interests that determine what sorts of issues a scientist investigates” change over time.…”

Section: The Argument From Changing Research Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true because it is not the case that scientists are especially skilled at developing theories that are likely true or approximately true. A contemporary proponent of this argument for antirealism is Brad Wray ( 2008 ) and ( 2018 ). The fourth is an argument for antirealism from what Kyle Stanford ( 2006 ) calls the “Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For these reasons, Stanford argues, we should not believe our present scientific theories are (approximately) true. The fifth argument purports to show that many of the scientific theories we currently accept will be discarded sometime in the future, like the “ pessimistic induction” does, but it proceeds from the premise that the research goals and interests of scientists change over time (Wray 2018 ).…”

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Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Mizrahi

2020

Synthese Library

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In this chapter, I present in canonical (or standard) form and then evaluate key arguments against scientific realism (or for antirealism about science). The first argument is known as the “ pessimistic induction” or the “pessimistic meta-induction.” In its original formulation, attributed to Larry Laudan (Philos Sci 48(1):19–49, 1981), the argument is based on a list of theories that are supposed to be counterexamples to the realist thesis that empirical success is a mark of (approximate) truth. Other formulations of the argument have it as an inductive argument from a sample of theories that were discarded in the past to the conclusion that our present scientific theories will probably be discarded as well. The second argument is a positive argument for Bas van Fraassen’s (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980) antirealist position, namely, Constructive Empiricism. The third argument proceeds from the observation that scientists cannot claim to be in a privileged epistemic position. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true because scientists are not especially skilled at developing theories that are likely true or approximately true. A contemporary proponent of this argument for antirealism is Brad Wray (Int Stud Philos Sci 22(3):317–326, 2008). The fourth is an argument for antirealism from what Kyle Stanford (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) calls the “Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). According to Stanford, the historical record of science reveals that past scientists typically failed to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories. This is supposed to make it more likely that present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-successful theories. For these reasons, Stanford argues, we should not believe our present scientific theories are (approximately) true. The fifth argument purports to show that many of the scientific theories we currently accept will be discarded sometime in the future, as the “ pessimistic induction” does, but it proceeds from the premise that the research goals and interests of scientists change over time (Wray, Brad K., Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).

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“…Some do it by inductive reasoning. An inductive version of the “Graveyard” Argument can be found in Brad Wray’s ( 2018 , pp. 68–69) book-length defense of antirealism.…”

Section: The “Graveyard” Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Underconsideration Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Argument From Changing Research Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Mizrahi

2020

Synthese Library

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Potential Lessons for DSM From Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Kendler

2022

JAMA Psychiatry

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Introduction

Mizrahi¹

2020

Synthese Library

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The main objective of this book is to provide an introductory overview of a “hot topic” in contemporary philosophy of science, namely, the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is accessible to students of philosophy as well as students of the sciences who might have an interest in philosophical questions about science. Unlike other books on the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science, this book takes an argumentation approach to the debate. That is to say, rather than devote an entire book to a defense of scientific realism (of some variety or another) or antirealism (of some variety or another), I survey and evaluate what I take to be the key positions and arguments in the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science. Also unlike many books in the contemporary scientific realism/antirealism literature, this book does not include detailed descriptions of a few case studies from the history of science. Instead, this book includes detailed analyses and evaluations of the key arguments these case studies from the history of science are supposed to motivate in the first place. The book concludes with several arguments for my own brand of scientific realism, namely, Relative Realism. I take Relative Realism to be a middle ground position between scientific realism and antirealism.

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Resisting Scientific Realism

Cited by 39 publications

References 128 publications

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Potential Lessons for DSM From Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Introduction

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