Potential Lessons for <i>DSM</i> From Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Kendler, Kenneth S.

doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.3559

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This, in spite of the fact that we can only observe the signs, symptoms, and course of the illnesses we postulate result from these disorders [87]. Thus, it would be highly desirable to explore next-generation "instrumentalist" approaches that consider existing constructs as mere tools to be evaluated on their empirical adequacy [87]. It is evident that in this third decade of the 21st century, an era of breathtaking neuroscientific advances and the dawn of personalized medicine and precision psychiatry, patients and their relatives have a right to expect more than diagnoses based on the phenomenological description of their experiences [50].…”

Section: The Nomenclature Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 89%

“…It is worth pointing out that every one of these terms, including DD, is arbitrary and colored by the "realist" tradition that considers constructs such as schizophrenia or SUD as true reflections of mental phenomena. This, in spite of the fact that we can only observe the signs, symptoms, and course of the illnesses we postulate result from these disorders [87]. Thus, it would be highly desirable to explore next-generation "instrumentalist" approaches that consider existing constructs as mere tools to be evaluated on their empirical adequacy [87].…”

Section: The Nomenclature Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Addictive and other mental disorders: a call for a standardized definition of dual disorders

Szerman

Torrens²,

Maldonado³

et al. 2022

Transl Psychiatry

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The persistent difficulty in conceptualizing the relationship between addictive and other mental disorders stands out among the many challenges faced by the field of Psychiatry. The different philosophies and schools of thought about, and the sheer complexity of these highly prevalent clinical conditions make progress inherently difficult, not to mention the profusion of competing and sometimes contradictory terms that unnecessarily exacerbate the challenge. The lack of a standardized term adds confusion, fuels stigma, and contributes to a “wrong door syndrome” that captures the difficulty of not only diagnosing but also treating addictive and other mental disorders in an integrated manner. The World Association on Dual Disorders (WADD) proposes the adoption of the term “Dual Disorder” which, while still arbitrary, would help harmonize various clinical and research efforts by rallying around a single, more accurate, and less stigmatizing designation.

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Section: The Nomenclature Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: The Nomenclature Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Addictive and other mental disorders: a call for a standardized definition of dual disorders

Szerman

Torrens²,

Maldonado³

et al. 2022

Transl Psychiatry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(emphasis added; Andreasen, 2007 , p. 111). Our perspective builds on others’ recent work in similar areas, including works emphasizing fundamental philosophical principles (e.g., Aftab et al, 2021 ; Kendler, 2022 ; Kendler and Zachar, 2019 ), historical overviews (e.g., Clark et al, 2017 ; Harrington, 2019 ), constructs (e.g., Bringmann et al, 2022 ; Hayden, 2022 ), and measurement (e.g., Fried et al, 2022 ; Haslbeck et al, 2021 ). We recommend to interested readers these excellent published pieces.…”

Section: A Brief History Of Depression Over Time: Classification and ...mentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Yet, leading philosophical scholars cogently argue that psychopathological disorders, such as depression, are not essential kinds and do not possess any real essence. Instead, such philosophers assert that depression exhibits characteristics of either soft realism (e.g., as in the case of biological species) with fuzzy boundaries and conflicting conceptualizations, or as a practical kind, based on an instrumentalist approach to science that is pragmatic and avoids deep ontological claims (Kendler, 2022 ).…”

Section: What Is Depression and What Do We Know About It?mentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do We Know About Depression Among Youth and How Can We Make Progress Toward Improved Understanding and Reducing Distress? A New Hope

Hankin

Griffith

2023

Clin Child Fam Psychol Rev

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This paper summarizes many findings about depression among children and adolescents. Depression is prevalent, highly distressing, and exerts considerable burden worldwide. Rates surge from childhood through young adulthood and have increased over the last decade. Many risk factors have been identified, and evidence-based interventions exist targeting mostly individual-level changes via psychological or pharmacological means. At the same time, the field appears stuck and has not achieved considerable progress in advancing scientific understanding of depression’s features or delivering interventions to meet the challenge of youth depression’s high and growing prevalence. This paper adopts several positions to address these challenges and move the field forward. First, we emphasize reinvigoration of construct validation approaches that may better characterize youth depression’s phenomenological features and inform more valid and reliable assessments that can enhance scientific understanding and improve interventions for youth depression. To this end, history and philosophical principles affecting depression’s conceptualization and measurement are considered. Second, we suggest expanding the range and targets of treatments and prevention efforts beyond current practice guidelines for evidence-based interventions. This broader suite of interventions includes structural- and system-level change focused at community and societal levels (e.g., evidence-based economic anti-poverty interventions) and personalized interventions with sufficient evidence base. We propose that by focusing on the FORCE (Fundamentals, Openness, Relationships, Constructs, Evidence), youth depression research can provide new hope.

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“…Some do so using the evidence derived from psychopharmacology (Feinstein et al, 2021). However, those who opted for philosophical calculus to tackle this conceptual complexity have raised more questions that must be addressed (Fulford, 1995;Kendler, 2022;Thornton, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental Disorder as an Illness: Szasz Revisited

Bamijoko-Okungbaye¹

2022

LUMEN: SS

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Thomas Szasz was a psychiatrist with great intellectual sagacity, consistent and unwavering with his concept of mental illness. He famously argues that mental illness is a myth. If Szasz's arguments are prima facie propositions and mental health interventions are considered myth-making endeavors, psychopharmacological engagement during treatment might be the most unjustified coercion of this generation. For Szasz, mental disorders are in the realm of psycho-social-ethical-legal. He views the existing treatment model of mental illness as an ideological validation of coercion. This tension in his findings stems from two angles, the exclusion of bodily illness dynamics that is currently unknown and extreme activities that are not considered illnesses. Call this the value-ladenness of the mental disorder proposition. I maintain that this proposition fails to show the polythetic nature of mental disorders. Specifically, I aver that the value-ladenness proposition on which his theory is predicated requires that we deny the emergent anatomical-physiological factual norms that plausibly can exist, namely knowledge of brain structures and functions in neuroscience. I claim that such knowledge can emerge. Howbeit, Szasz's framework is partially valid when he admits the psychosocial features of mental disorders due to the value-ladenness of mental disorders. I will consolidate this partial validity with a position accordant with realist philosophy drawing from Foucault, Fulford, and Kendell solidified by the evidence of cognitive-affective science within the domain of contemporary ampliative understanding of mental conditions to answer the questions raised by Szasz's proposition.

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Potential Lessons for DSM From Contemporary Philosophy of Science

Cited by 13 publications

References 11 publications

Addictive and other mental disorders: a call for a standardized definition of dual disorders

Addictive and other mental disorders: a call for a standardized definition of dual disorders

What Do We Know About Depression Among Youth and How Can We Make Progress Toward Improved Understanding and Reducing Distress? A New Hope

Mental Disorder as an Illness: Szasz Revisited

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