Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game

Quan, Ji; Caixia, Tang; Zhou, Yawen; Wang, Xianjia; Yang, Jian‐Bo

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109517

Cited by 35 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…Zhan et al [20] established a multiobjective Stackelberg game model under incomplete information, trying to solve the problem of maintaining the reputation of the cross-border e-commerce platform when the reputation maintainer faces one or more damages. Quan et al [21] discussed a reputation evaluation mechanism considering tolerance based on game theory. Wang et al [22] established a reputation update method for free-riding and false data, which improved the credibility of the system.…”

Section: Research On Reputation Evaluation Methodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Dimension Reduction: Feature Subset” Method for Selecting the Best Index Combination in Reputation Evaluation of Crowdsourcing Participants

Huang

Zheng

Wei

2022

Mobile Information Systems

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An effective reputation evaluation mechanism is an essential guarantee for the crowdsourcing mode's healthy, orderly, and rapid development. Aiming at the problems of unsound reputation evaluation mechanism, single reputation evaluation index, and poor discrimination ability of crowdsourcing platforms a “dimension reduction feature subset” method for selecting the best reputation evaluation index combination of crowdsourcing participants is proposed. This method first selects the best dimensionality reduction method by empirical method, then uses the classifier as the evaluation function of feature selection, and uses the sequential backward selection strategy (SBS) to select the feature subset and reputation evaluation algorithm with the best classification performance. The experimental results show that the reputation evaluation method of crowdsourcing participants based on ReliefF-SVM has the best performance in terms of accuracy, F1 measure, and stability and can select a comprehensive, objective, and effective evaluation index combination to distinguish the reputation status of crowdsourcing participants.

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Section: Research On Reputation Evaluation Methodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Dimension Reduction: Feature Subset” Method for Selecting the Best Index Combination in Reputation Evaluation of Crowdsourcing Participants

Huang

Zheng

Wei

2022

Mobile Information Systems

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“…This view actually highlights the social attribute of human beings; therefore, it is much closer to practical situations. Once a person is recognized as a betrayer, he or she is likely to be excluded from cooperation, see [26,27]. On the other hand, if a player has a good reputation for his or her altruistic behaviors or positive contributions to the class of repeated public goods games, the other players will be more willing to cooperate with this player [28][29][30].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Proportional-Egalitarian Allocation Policy for Public Goods Problems with Complex Network

Zhang

Dong

2021

Mathematics

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How free-riding behavior can be avoided is a constant topic in public goods problems, especially in persistent and complex resource allocation situations. In this paper, a novel allocation policy for public goods games with a complex network, called the proportional-egalitarian allocation method (PEA), is proposed. This allocation rule differs from the well-studied redistribution policies by following a two-step process without paying back into the common pool. A parameter is set up for dividing the total income into two parts, and then they are distributed by following the egalitarianism and proportional rule, respectively. The first part of total income is distributed equally, while the second part is allocated proportionally according to players’ initial payoffs. In addition, a new strategy-updating mechanism is proposed by comparing the average group payoffs instead of the total payoffs. Compared with regular lattice networks, this mechanism admits the difference of cooperative abilities among players induced by the asymmetric network. Furthermore, numerical calculations show that a relatively small income for the first distribution step will promote the cooperative level, while relatively less income for the second step may harm cooperation evolution. This work thus enriches the knowledge of allocation policies for public goods games and also provides a fresh perspective for the strategy-updating mechanism.

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“…In the spatial dilemma games, there are also studies assuming that reputation affects the strategy update rule [52][53][54][55][56][57] or link weight between partners [58][59][60][61]. Concerning the reputation evaluation, first-order information that only considers the focused individual's strategy is widely adopted [62][63][64][65][66]. Recently, the second-order reputation evaluation norms are introduced in the PGG, in which both one's behavior and the reputation of his opponents are considered [67][68][69].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to evaluate one's behavior toward ‘bad’ individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games

Quan¹,

Qin²,

Zhou³

et al. 2020

J. Stat. Mech.

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How to evaluate one's behavior toward 'bad' individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games high-reputation threshold environments, a well-mixed population structure can even promote cooperation more significantly than a lattice network. However, increasing reward intensity for cooperating with 'bad' individuals cannot further improve cooperation, but in a high-reputation threshold environment, increasing punishment intensity for defecting 'bad' individuals can further improve cooperation. This research extends the use of statistical physics to study the evolution of cooperation from the perspective of reputation-based dynamics.

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Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game

Cited by 35 publications

References 67 publications

“Dimension Reduction: Feature Subset” Method for Selecting the Best Index Combination in Reputation Evaluation of Crowdsourcing Participants

“Dimension Reduction: Feature Subset” Method for Selecting the Best Index Combination in Reputation Evaluation of Crowdsourcing Participants

A Proportional-Egalitarian Allocation Policy for Public Goods Problems with Complex Network

How to evaluate one's behavior toward ‘bad’ individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games

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