A Proportional-Egalitarian Allocation Policy for Public Goods Problems with Complex Network

Abstract

How free-riding behavior can be avoided is a constant topic in public goods problems, especially in persistent and complex resource allocation situations. In this paper, a novel allocation policy for public goods games with a complex network, called the proportional-egalitarian allocation method (PEA), is proposed. This allocation rule differs from the well-studied redistribution policies by following a two-step process without paying back into the common pool. A parameter is set up for dividing the total income into two parts, and then they are distributed by following the egalitarianism and proportional rule, respectively. The first part of total income is distributed equally, while the second part is allocated proportionally according to players’ initial payoffs. In addition, a new strategy-updating mechanism is proposed by comparing the average group payoffs instead of the total payoffs. Compared with regular lattice networks, this mechanism admits the difference of cooperative abilities among players induced by the asymmetric network. Furthermore, numerical calculations show that a relatively small income for the first distribution step will promote the cooperative level, while relatively less income for the second step may harm cooperation evolution. This work thus enriches the knowledge of allocation policies for public goods games and also provides a fresh perspective for the strategy-updating mechanism.

The Sense of Cooperation on Interdependent Networks Inspired by Influence-Based Self-Organization

“…Over the past few decades, scholars in various fields have made great efforts to alleviate social dilemmas from both theoretical and experimental aspects (please see the references [11][12][13][14][15] for more information). Among them, evolutionary game theory assumes that players have bounded retionality, providing a general and effective theoretical framework for modeling the conflict between individual interests and interests of collectives [16,17]. Furthermore, Nowak summarized these studies into five mechanisms to facilitate the evolution of cooperation, such as kin selection, direct reciprocity, group selection, indirect reciprocity, and spatial or network reciprocity [18].…”