Repressive Threats, Procedural Concessions, and the Zapatista Cycle of Protests, 1994—2003

Abstract

Using negative binomial models, I analyze the effects of repressive threats and procedural concessions on Zapatista protests from 1994 to 2003. Some of the results appear consistent with previous findings in the literature. Repressive threats had a negative initial effect and a positive delayed effect on protest activity and its simultaneous location across cities. However, procedural concessions had statistically insignificant negative initial and delayed effects on protests and their simultaneous location. Also contrary to the literature, when procedural concessions and repressive threats were combined, they had statistically insignificant positive initial and delayed effects on protest activity and its simultaneous location. Finally, democratization changes decreased Zapatista protests in the short and long term and helped to focus mobilization efforts on the remaining closed environments. Thus, democratization openings and an inconsistent use of repressive threats and procedural concessions did not strengthen the development of the movement; they contributed to the movement's relative weakness.

Inequality, Protests, and the Progressive Allocation of Cash Transfers in the Argentine Provinces

“…Protests signal likely alliances between nonincumbents and factions of the elite that may seek to unseat incumbents (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007;Navarro Yáñez and Gutiérrez 2009). Protests also provide opportunities for issue trespassing and issue capture by rising challengers (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992), allowing parties to gain the support of new voters (Goldstone and Tilly 2001;Inclán 2009). It has been argued that protests signal that individuals and groups are willing to invest resources to promote important issues (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and to strengthen their organizations (Piven and Cloward 1977).…”

From Top to Bottom (and Back to the Top Again): Federal Spending, Sub-national Coalitions, and Protests in Argentina, 2002–2006

“…Governors reward core allies with public resources and public employment. Also, thanks to their tight control, exerted 32 Arce and Rice (2009) and Inclan (2009) also use this model for addressing protest as the dependent variable. 33 In order to give a more intuitive and friendly interpretation of the results, I have transformed the coefficients into counts of protests.…”

“…Some examples of these informal practices are: the discretional distribution of public resources and positions to gain political leverage, the influence of party leaders in the selection of candidates to run for office and in the patterns of political carriers, the virtual overlapping among different 6 On protests and politics in Argentina see Farinetti 2000, Svampa and Pereyra 2003, Delamata 2004, Schuster et al 2005. Other examples from Latin America regarding the relationship between protest, politics and democratization are addressed in Favela Gavia 2005, Somuano Ventura 2007, Bruhn 2008and Inclan 2009 Examples of heterogeneity in trends of mobilizations across government levels can be seen in India (Palshikar and Yadav 2003), Switzerland (Tilly 2004 powers of government and among political parties structures and state agencies, the uneven enforcement of the rule of law across territories, among others, all of them practices that shape the features of the regime thus affecting protests. These informal features of the regime are also related to the performance of political institutions.…”

Ratification as accommodation? Domestic dissent and human rights treaties

“…2 Concessions were similarly given during the 1994-2003 Zapatista protests in Mexico (Inclán, 2009) as well as the Iranian Revolution (Rasler, 1996).…”