Representing Silence in Politics

Abstract

<jats:p>Democratic representation focuses on <jats:italic>voice</jats:italic>: it conceives voice as that which is represented and as the prime mode of representing. This article argues that this focus is problematic and turns instead to <jats:italic>silence</jats:italic> to ask a fundamental question: Can representation empower citizens from their silent positions? I approach the question in three parts. First, I offer a new conceptualization of silence, arguing that silence is best understood as the site of a potential or actual <jats:italic>presence.</jats:italic> Second, I use criteria of domination and displaced involvement to assess attempts to enfranchise silence within the transmission-belt model of representation. Third, I critically engage and strengthen constructivist views of representation by developing these criteria to assess the legitimacy of claims to represent—speak <jats:italic>about</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>for</jats:italic>—silent constituencies—namely, the claim to represent an (alleged) silent majority.</jats:p>

Unrepresentative Claims: Speaking for Oneself in a Social Movement

“…Ultimately, the leaders’ unrepresentative claims served their (implicit) representative claims that they were able to embody the movement, without being accountable to its members. Whether these claims have inclusive effects or not depends on how the members of the constituency they create can themselves participate in politics—which sometimes mean contesting the very claims that gave them a voice (Brito Vieira 2020; Disch 2011; Hayat 2018). Still, unrepresentative claims, which are bound to flourish in a political world marked by a crisis of representative democracy, contribute to reshaping the representative system as a whole.…”

Towards a Democratic Theory of Silence

“…Our analysis would suggest that, for this reason, there must be some institutional means for citizens to clarify and contest interpretations of their silence, without overriding their democratic right to silence. Although it is outside of the scope of this article, there is now a serious debate about how electoral systems should deal with silent abstentions in ways that could avoid distortions (see, e.g., Gray, 2021; Vieira, 2020). Much of this debate presupposes, but does not develop, the kind of careful conceptual parsing of communicative silence that we are engaged in here.…”

“… 2 For example, in Gray (2015) I survey various motivations for silent citizenship but do not consider the communicative implications (see also Vieira, 2020). Here, I take up the separate question of how to theorize communicative silence directly and evaluate its democratic potentials. …”

“… 3 Some important exceptions are Allen (2010); Ferguson (2003); Gray (2015); Jungkunz (2012), and Vieira (2020), each of which I take up as the article unfolds. …”

Silence in political theory and practice

“…Once dominant, the negative conception of silence-as-absence is now under pressure (Acheson, 2008;Brito Vieira et al, 2019;Brito Vieira, 2020;Ferguson, 2003;Jaworski, 1993;Jungkunz, 2012). This pressure has arisen from two main concerns which lie at the heart of this special issue.…”