Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts

Abstract

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A Model of Ngo Regulation with an Application to Uganda

“…Extensions that address this issue would evidently be in order. Lastly,Bougheas et al (2011) have shown, in the context of international lending, that conditionalities imposed on borrowers may be inefficient in the presence of multiple, competing lenders. The issue of whether competition among multiple donors, for the services of a given pool of NGOs, may likewise affect and qualify the optimal approach to NGO regulation, constitutes another important line of future enquiry suggested by this paper.12 SeeGuriev (2004),Bardhan (1997),Mookherjee and Png (1995) andShleifer and Vishny (1993).13 Bougheas et al (2007) show, in the general context of charitable donations, that widely popular donor conditionalities may be inefficient, yet persist indefinitely.…”