Trade credit is an important source of finance for firms and has been well researched, but the focus has been on financial tradeoffs. In this paper we consider the tradeoffs with inventories and develop a simple model that recognises the incentives a firm faces to offer and receive trade credit. Our model identifies the response of accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost of inventories, profitability, risk and liquidity, and importantly, this influence operates through a production channel. Our results support the model and complement many existing studies focused on explaining the financial terms of trade credit.JEL classification: G31, G32

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This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow the firm to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we introduce trade credit as an additional source of funding. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in market and bank lending, and an increase in trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 manufacturing firms.

We introduce infrastructure as a cost-reducing technology in Romer's (1987) model of endogenous growth. We show that infrastructure can promote specialization and long-run growth, even though its effect on the latter is non-monotonic, reflecting its resource costs. We provide evidence using data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures that suggests that the degree of specialization is positively correlated with core infrastructure, as predicted by the model. We also provide evidence from cross-country regressions, using physical measures of infrastructure provision, that shows a robust non-monotonic relationship between infrastructure and growth. JEL Classification: 041,050Infrastructure, spécialisation et croissance économique. Les auteurs introduisent l'infrastructure en tant que technologie réduisant les coûts dans un modèle de croissance endogène à la Romer (1987). On montre que l'infrastructure peut promouvoir la spécialisation et la croissance en longue péride, même si ses effets sur la croissance ne sont pas monotones et reflètent ses coûts en ressource. On montre, en utilisant les données du recensement des manufactures des Etats Unis, que le degré de spécialisation est relié positivement à l'infrastructure de base, comme le suggère le modèle. On montre aussi à l'aide de régressions transversales, utilisant des mesures physiques de l'infrastructure, qu'il existe une relation non monotone mais robuste entre infrastructure et croissance.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for constructive comments.

HighlightsWe examine the role of consultation and group decision making on risk-taking.We replicate previous experiments showing higher risk-taking in groups relative to isolated individuals.We find peer effects in consultative groups: the decisions of individuals who consult with one another are correlated.We find that consultation does not change the average level of risk-taking relative to a treatment where individuals make decisions in isolation.We conclude that consultation effects alone cannot explain the higher level of risk-taking by groups relative to isolated individuals.

We investigate how apprenticeship training affects the early career mobility and earnings profiles of young apprentices in Germany. The heterogeneous quality and nature (whether general or firm specific) of training across firms is expected to be reflected in the post‐apprenticeship mobility and earning patterns of young workers. In this paper, we argue that a simple model of training and labour turnover can explain such patterns. Specifically, assuming that job changes are associated with a loss of accumulated firm‐specific skills, the model predicts that although movers initially experience a productivity loss, their earnings grow at a faster rate than those of stayers. As job changes become more costly the longer a worker stays with the training firm, later movers experience a larger reduction in their earnings compared with direct movers. Estimated selectivity‐corrected earnings equations for movers and stayers, based on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), support the predictions of the model and highlight important differences in earnings profiles and mobility patterns by apprenticeship firm size.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. Then, we prove that there are long-term gains from trade if the marginal utility of income is constant or as long as losers from trade are compensated by winners. Finally, we look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out depending on the distribution of human capital, autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the outcome of majority voting. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: F1.