Rent Seeking and Political Economy of Geographical Indication Foods

Abstract

Protected Designation of Origin and Protected Geographical Indication are European labeling regulations aimed at protecting names of origin and traditional methods of production of specialty foods. Property rights on these marks are allocated, by a public authority, to a specific area. However, the size of the protected area is hardly defined solely on technical characteristics, rather it is often an issue of political debate among different stakeholders (producers and consumers). This paper aims at investigating the bargaining process leading to the definition of a Geographical Indication area. Drawing on historical evidence from three cases, we build a three-stage Political Economy Model in which the size of the protected area is endogenously determined. The resulting politically optimal area is compared to the social optimum. Results show that lobbying strength, quantity supplied, and market potential play an important role in explaining deviations from the social optimum. [EconLit citations: D72; I18; Q18]. C 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Wine Regulations

“…In general, it is not clear how lobbying will affect the political outcome; for instance, "insider" producers may prefer either a smaller region (to restrict supply and charge higher prices) or a larger region (to allow better sharing of fixed costs) relative to the social optimum. Landi and Stefani (2015) review historical evidence on the expansion of three GIs, and confirm that the process of setting the boundaries of a GI is not a purely technical matter but a political process. The history of major European wine GIs further supports this "political economy" view.…”

Vidékfejlesztési támogatások munkaerőpiaci hatásainak települési szintű útmodellezése magyarországi községek mintáin

“…A korábbi EU-s regionális vagy vidékfejlesztési források, illetve programok hatáselemzésével foglalkozó tanulmányok között akadnak az oksági kapcsolatok alaposabb feltárásával készült kutatások is. Kiemelt figyelmet fordítottak az elemzők egy-egy úttörő programra, így például a helyi termékek és védjegyek hatásaira (Cei, Defrancesco, Stefani 2018;Landi, Stefani 2015;Parasecoli, Tasaki 2011), vagy az endogén helyi fejlesztés "kísérleti" programjára, a LEADER programra (Barke, Newton 1997;Bosworth et al 2016;Esparcia Perez 2000;Papadopoulou, Hasanagas, Harvey 2011). A területi és vidékfejlesztési források általános hatáselemzése esetén kihívást jelent, hogy e programok szándékuk szerint a gazdaságitársadalmi élet számtalan aspektusára egyszerre szeretnének hatást gyakorolni.…”

No Terroir in the Cold? A Note on the Geography of Geographical Indications

“…GIs can reduce information asymmetries and improve efficiency (M erel and Sexton, 2012). However, GIs can also be used as protectionist instruments as they create rents for land and vineyard owners, thereby providing incentives for lobbying to influence political decisions on GIs (Moschini et al, 2008;Landi and Stefani, 2015). These (potential) mixed effects are at the heart of current trade disputes and complicate the determination of whether regulations (such as GIs) enhance welfare or are protectionist instruments, both conceptually and empirically (Beghin et al, 2015).…”